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/ ' Abstract 
Plant Breeders' Rights (PBR) are a fOTIn of intellectual property rights enabling 
breeders of new plant varieties to have the exclusive right to produce and sell 
propagating material of their new plant varieties. The existence of effective 
property rights has been pointed to as a stimulus of increased R&D and 
productivity. Canada has had legislation to provide PBR protection for about two 
decades, and is considering further strengthening of the regulatory framework. 
However, there are few studies that have examined the effectiveness of the 
legislation on crop productivity. This thesis investigates the hypothesis that the 
adoption of wheat varieties qualifying for Plant Breeders' Rights has increased 
overall wheat yields and rate of yield increase. The yield response function 
models are applied to industry data for western Canada and Alberta, respectively. 
The empirical results show that the PBR Act had a relatively small impact on 
wheat yields. Among wheat classes, it had a positive impact for Durum wheat in 
Alberta. 
Résumé 
Les obtentions végétales sont protégées par un droit de propriété intellectuelle qui 
donne aux obtenteurs de nouvelles variétés végétales l'exclusivité de la 
production et de la vente du matériel de multiplication de ces variétés. L'existence 
des droits de propriété efficaces a été pointue à comme un stimulus d'augmenté 
R&D et de productivité. Le Canada a eu la législation pour fournir la protection de 
PBR pour à peu près deux décennies et il considère plus fortifiant du cadre 
régulateur. Mais peu d'études ont examiné l'efficacité de la législation sur la 
productivité de récolte. La thèse examine l'hypothèse: l'adoption de variétés de blé 
qualifiant pour Les obtentions végétales ont augmenté les rendements de blé et le 
taux d'augmentation de rendement. Les modèles de fonction de réponse de 
rendement sont appliqués respectivement pour les données d'industrie dans l'ouest 
du Canada et l'Alberta. Les deux résultats empiriques trouvent que PBR Act a eu 
le petit impact sur les rendements de blé. Parmi les classes de blé, il a eu un impact 
positif pour le blé de Durum dans l'Alberta. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
To encourage investment in research and development (R&D) and other creative 
endeavors, many countries have institutions to protect intellectual property rights 
(IPRs). The rationale for protecting IPR is weIl established and stems from the 
inability of firms to appropriate the returns of their innovations given the public 
good nature of knowledge that is embodied in them. While industrial products and 
processes have been protected via patents, trademarks and copyrights for centuries, 
the protection ofliving organisms is a recent phenomenon. For example, it was not 
until 1930 that asexually propagated plants were first protected as intellectual 
property in U.S. (through plant patents) and in 1970 protection was extended to 
sexually propagated plants in U.S. via the Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA). 
Perhaps, more significant is the trend in the United States to award utility patents 
to living organisms ever since the landmark Chakrabarty v Diamondi ruling that 
granted a patent on a novel bacterium. The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office now 
regularly issues patents on novel plant varieties, animal breeds, as weIl as a host of 
genetically modified organisms following the decisions of both cases: ex parte 
Hibberd 1985 and ex parte Allen 19872• 
While the U.S. has broadened the scope and subject matter of patentability, most 
countries induding Canada, still do not permit the patenting of living organisms, 
due to the concerns about the ethics involved in patenting higher life forms. 
Nevertheless, there was the recognition that R&D investments and efforts of plant 
breeders in developing novel varieties needed to be rewarded by the granting of 
1 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980) 
2 Ex parte Hibberd, 227 U.S.P.Q.443 (1985); Ex parte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q 2d.1425 (1987) 
sorne forrn of intellectual property protection. It was with this objective that in 
1961 the Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plant (UPOV) was 
established and along with the Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of 
Plants which provided a sui generic method for the protection of plant varieties 
and provided protocols for assessing and describing the unique characteristics of a 
new variety, ensuring that it is distinct, uniforrn and stable, the so called DUS 
criteria. Any new variety that fulfills the DUS criteria is eligible for protection. 
Most European and OECD countries conforrn to the UPOV Convention to protect 
plant varieties but do not allow patent protections (The World Bank, 2006). In 
reeent years, more and more developing countries have introduced or modernized 
legislation pertaining to plant breeders' rights as a fulfillment for the TRIPS 
multilateral agreement (Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property) of WTO 
(World Trade Organization). TRIPS (2002) requires member countries of WTO to 
implement minimum standards of protection for major types of intellectual 
property rights. 
In Canada, the Plant Breeders' Rights Act (PBR Act) was enacted into law on 
August 1, 1990. However, its passage was not without controversy as evident by 
the fact that before its eventual passage, the bill was introduced to the House of 
Cornrnons three times--in 1980, 1988 and 1989 but failed to corne into effect. 
Much of the opposition to the granting of the PBR Act arose from the ethics of 
"ownership" of living organisms. Critics warned it would be a precedent-setting 
case to allow life ownership and would open doors to full patent rights on the other 
forms of life. Other concerns included the monopoly control by private firms over 
plants that would lead to higher seed priees for farmers and higher food priees for 
consumers. Moreover, people were afraid that multinational companies that had 
the capital to conduct R&D would eventually control seeds and genetic resources 
thereby putting farmers and consurners at a disadvantage (The Ottawa Citizen, 
2 
1989). Sorne groups such as the Canadian Environmental Law Association (CELA) 
expressed concems and predicted pesticide manufacturers would sell varieties 
tailored to certain chemicals and that could lead to an "environrnentally damaging" 
agriculture system and consequently underrnine efforts to increase organic farming 
in Canada (The Ottawa Citizen, 1989). 
Proponents of the PBR Act argued that it was a necessary tool to encourage 
innovation as it would allow breeders the opportunity to collect royalties on the 
seeds they develop by giving them the necessary incentive to undertake more R&D. 
It was felt that a larger amount of private R&D would complement that of the 
public institutions and provide more research that would lead to the development 
of new and better plant varieties benefiting farrners and consumers (The Windsor 
Star, 1988). In addition, it was argued that the PBR Act would place Canadian 
plant breeders on an equal footing with other major competitors such as the United 
States who had access to such protection. Advocates of the legislation indicated the 
PBR Act could promote Canadian cultivars in foreign countries and thus enable 
greater in-bound and out-bound technology transfer and commercialization of new 
plant varieties (Downey, 1977). Other benefits such as encouraging the 
development of joint ventures and stimulating cooperation in the plant breeding 
industry have also been suggested. 
Under the Canadian PBR Act that was eventually passed in 1990, there are four 
criteria or bases for granting property rights to novel plant varieties. First, the 
varieties must be new in the sense that they have never been commercially planted 
in Canada prior to application. Second, the variety must be distinct or different 
from all other varieties on the market. Third, the variety must be uniforrn such that 
the variation from variety to variety must be predictable and can be described by 
the breeder. Finally, the variety must be stable; that is, remain true to description 
3 
from generation to generation (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2006b). 
Once rights are granted on a particular variety, the breeder and/or owner has legal 
control over the variety and other propagating material for a duration of 18 years. 
During the protected period the owners may charge a royalty for the propagation 
and sale of the protected variety and take legal action against individuals that are 
unauthorized to commercialize the variety. But the scope of protection provided by 
the PBR Act is not as broad as that of patents. There are two notable differences. 
First, under the PBR Act, a "farmer's exemption" allows growers to save and use 
the protected seed varieties without infringing on the holders' rights. The PBR Act 
placed limited or no restrictions on the use of the harvested product resulting from 
the sowing of the protected seed variety. Secondly, a "research exemption" allows 
for breeder and researchers to use the protected varieties for the purposes of 
developing new plant varieties or research on them. It is based on the recognition 
that further breeding necessitates the physical use of existing plant varieties as an 
intermediate input in further varietal development (Eaton, 2006). 
Did the PBR Act achieve its intended goals? To answer this basic question and as 
part of the requirements of the Act, the Canada Food Inspection Agency 
(CFIA)-the federal agency responsible for implementing the Act-was mandated 
to review the impacts of the PBR Act after a ten years' period. The CFIA review, 
published in 200 1, was generally positive of the impacts that the PBR Act was 
having by pointing out that the private sector had increased its investment by over 
100%, the public sector was benefiting through receipts of royalties that were 
re-invested Înto R&D, access to foreign varieties by growers had improved, and 
the development of improved varieties had increased. 
4 
1.2 Statement of Problem 
While the PBR Act was viewed by the CFIA as having a positive impact, the 
results need to be interpreted with sorne caution. First, the methodology employed 
by the CFIA was qualitative in nature and solicited the expert opinions of plant 
breeders, researchers, seed traders, farmers, nurserymen, industry organizations 
and government agencies. Most information was from in-pers on and telephone 
interviews from the various stakeholders and we know that consulting information 
could be subjective and thereby relying on it could reduce the reliability of the 
results. AdditionaHy, without quantitative analysis, the results would not be 
rigorous enough to reflect the real impact. Even if the interviewees' opinions were 
expressed objectively, 76 people from aH aspects of horticulture and agriculture 
industry is not enough to make the sample unbiased. 
A case in point is how the CFIA review evaluated the impact of the PBR Act on 
crop productivity. The report found that there had been significant productivity 
gains made in the agriculture industry as measured by increase in yield and 
expansion in area, but the analysis only compared the difference in the yield and 
area data for the years 1990 and 2000. Using this approach, the report found that 
for wheat, there was a 22% increase in yield ofwhich 60 to 75% was attributed to 
PBR Act based on the estimates of the expert opinions of the breeders that were 
consulted. A number of difficulties arise with using this approach. First by only 
looking at the difference between 1990 and 2000, the analysis ignores any trends in 
the data which could be more suggestive. Second, the analysis does not control for 
other variables, such as improvements in agronomie factors. Third, by using expert 
opinions to attribute the yield gain to PBR, the analysis is influenced by individual 
biases that may not be reflective of the actual impact. It is impossible to determine 
whether yields in other years during the ten year period were increasing aH the 
5 
time or were fluctuating. Without detailed and precise analysis, this finding is 
inconclusive. Overall, the CFIA review provides no quantitative analysis to 
support the claims of the experts. 
The argument for the PBR Act is to provide the necessary incentives for the 
development of novel crop varieties which are "better" than the available varieties 
and which eventually will lead to commercialization and widespread adoption. 
One might hypothesize that the protected varieties would result in higher yields 
over time, since farmers would grow more protected (and productive) varieties to 
increase profits. Plant breeders and seed companies would also benefit from higher 
sales of their protected varieties and would re-invest their profits into further 
varietal development resulting in ever more improved varieties. To consider this 
possibility, this thesis tests this basis hypothesis for the case ofwheat. Wheat is one 
of the major cereal crops for export and for domestic consumption in Canada and 
relies heavily on PBR certificates for intellectual property protection. Since wheat 
is an open-pollinated crop, PBRs are an important tool for breeders to appropriate 
the retums of their research effort. 
To understand what impact the PBR Act has had on the wheat economy, Figures 1 
and 2, show the annual yields before and after 1994, while Figure 3 shows the 
harvested area for the past fort Y years for the major wheat classes in Canada. If the 
PBR Act was effective, one might expect yield and area trend to increase after 
1994 when the new protected varieties were available to growers for commercial 
use. 
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Figure 1: Annual Wheat Yields in Western Canada (1965-1994) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1965-1994) 
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Figure 2: Annual Wheat Yields in Western Canada (1994-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1994-2006) 
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Figure 3: Annual HarvestArea of Wheat in Western Canada (1965-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1965-2006) 
According to Figure 1 and 2, there is no clear difference between the slopes of the 
trend lines of aIl wheat before and after 1994. Both slopes are positive but smaIl, 
suggesting there has not been much yield shift as indicated from the PBR review of 
CFIA. Nevertheless, the yield gaps between winter wheat and other classes of 
wheat increased after 1994. However, without controlling for other factors, it is 
still unknown whether this yield gap is attributed to the PBR Act or not. On the 
other hand, if the PBR Act had a positive impact, we would expect an expansion of 
wheat area along with the increased yield. However, from Figure 3, wheat harvest 
area declined in the early 1990s and continued to dec1ine until recently, primarily 
impacted by the reduced market opportunities. 
It is evident from examining the trends in Figures 1, 2 and 3 that there was no 
dramatic shift in the productivity of wheat since the protected varieties became 
available to producers in 1994. There could be a number of reasons. First, the PBR 
Act did not induce much incentive for R&D investment so that the few new 
8 
;-
varieties available for use are not higher yielding. Second, even though our Figures 
show that there was not a dramatic shi ft in wheat productivity, the PBR Act could 
still have an effect as we are not controlling for other factors (e.g., agronomic 
improvements) . 
To explore whether the productivity performance of wheat since the PBR Act was 
enacted is due simply to a lack of protected varieties available, Figure 4 highlights 
the trend in PBR applications and certificates issued for wheat. Canada began to 
accept wheat PBR applications in 1992 and the first right was granted in 1993. 
Agricultural crops that have been granted Plant Breeders' Rights in Canada are 
concentrated in cereal crops including wheat, barley, corn and oats; oilseeds 
including cano la, soybeans and flax; and pulse crops including peas and beans. 
Oilseeds account for more than 60% of total agriculture applications while cereals 
comprise for about 23% (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2006a). During 1992 
to 2006, there were 102 wheat PBR applications and 52 applicants were granted 
PBR rights. Both applications and rights granted are increasing. 
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Figure 4: PBRApplications and Rights Granted for Wheat (1992-2006) 
Source: Canada Food Inspection Agency PBR office (2006a) 
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Figure 5 shows the number of wheat varieties planted in western Canada from 
1998-2006 and the corresponding number of PBR wheat varieties. Both the total 
number of wheat varieties and PBR varieties has trended upward. In 1998, the 
PBR varieties comprised only 20% of aU varieties while in 2006 they comprised of 
48%. It seems that more and more protected varieties were planted in western 
Canada. If protected varieties were more productive and more of them were 
planted, the yields would be expected to trend upward as weIl. However, the yields 
did not follow the upward trend. It increased at the beginning and decreased later 
and then increased again. Even if PBR varieties were more productive, it is very 
likely that other factors such as c1imatic conditions and improvements in 
agronomic practices may have influenced yields. Without accounting for these 
factors, the effect of the PBR Act on wheat productivity is unc1ear. 
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Figure 5: Number of AIl and PBR Wheat Varieties Planted in Western Canada (1998-2006) 
Source: Canadian Wheat Board (1998-2006), Statistics Canada (1998-2006) 
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Western Canada is the major wheat-producing area in Canada and it accounts for 
97% of aIl wheat planted in Canada. There are eight classes of wheat grown in 
Canada: Western Red Spring, Western Red Winter, Western Extra Strong, Prairie 
Spring Red, Prairie Spring White, Amber Durum, Soft White.spring and Hard 
White Spring (Canadian Grain Commission. 2007). Figure 6 illustrates the acreage 
share of PBR varieties for eight wheat classes in western Canada. From the Figure, 
it is apparent that no Soft White Spring wheat varieties had varieties that were 
protected by Plant Breeders' Rights, while Western Extra Strong and Western Red 
Winter began to have varieties qualifying for PBR only in recent years. For the rest 
of the wheat classes, the acreage share of PBR varieties shows an upward trend. 
Whether this trend was due to more protected varieties planted or protected 
varieties seeded to a larger area, the PBR Act does seem to have a positive impact 
on the availability of new varieties. 
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Figure 6: Share of Acreage ofPBR Varieties by Class in Western Canada (1998-2006) 
Source: Canadian Wheat Board (1998-2006), 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency PBR Office (2006a) 
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1.3 Objective and Hypotheses 
The above analysis reveals that the impact of PBR on wheat productivity is at best 
ambiguous rather than positive which was the conclusion reached by the CFIA. It 
remains unknown whether the PBR Act has led to superior varieties or just to a 
proliferation of varieties that differ in little more than name. Wheat is an 
open-pollinated crop and the genotypes of open-pollinated varieties remain 
virtually unchanged across generations, so growers can purchase seeds in one year 
and replant the seeds from the previous harvest. In this way, breeders receive only 
partial royalties, which may reduce the incentives to invest (Venner, 1997). 
Therefore there is need to find econometric evidence to quantify the relationship 
between the PBR Act and wheat productivity and to ascertain what effect the PBR 
Act had on wheat productivity improvements. Meanwhile, since the Canadian 
PBR Act adheres to the terms of the 1978 UPOV Convention, different interest 
groups (the PBR office, seed industry, and representatives from horticulture and 
agriculture industries) are trying to bring the Act in compliance with the latest 
1991 UPOV Convention in order to further strengthen the intellectual propertY 
protection. Renee, a better understanding of the eeonomic effect of the PBR Aet 
will help poliey makers and related interest groups to improve t~e design of the 
PBR regime in Canada, whieh will consequently benefit society and foster large 
investments in R&D. 
Therefore, the objective of this research is to examine the effects of the PBR Act 
on wheat productivity improvement: to evaluate the impact of the PBR Act on 
wheat yields and to estimate the different effects of the PBR Act across different 
classes of wheat. 
Based on the above analysis, the hypotheses of the study are 1) the adoption of 
wheat varieties qualifying for Plant Breeders' Rights has increased overall wheat 
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yields and the rate of yield increase; 2) the PBR Act has different impacts on 
different wheat classes as the breeders' market size varies between these classes. 
i.4 Study structure 
In the next chapter, we are going to briefly review studies on the impact of IPRs 
(Patents, etc) on productivity and economic growth. This is followed by a 
comprehensive review of studies on the impact of PBR from different perspectives: 
R&D investment, productivity, international technology transfer, distribution of 
benefits and industry structure. Next, we will examine specific PBR wheat studies 
and highlight CUITent controversies surrounding PBR and identify research gaps. 
For the data and methodology part, first we de scribe the data used to analyze the 
yield trends and patterns of adoption of wheat varieties. Based on previous studies 
about the determinants of crop yield, we will develop the conceptual framework of 
yield response functions and respective empirical models for western Canada and 
Alberta. 
With regard to the empirical analysis, first we will examine the econometric 
evidence of the relationship between provincial wheat yields and PBR Act in 
western Canada. Then, we investigate the econometric evidence of the relationship 
between wheat variety yields and PBR Act for different wheat classes in Alberta. 
Finally, study conclusions are summarized, discussing limitations and policy 
implications and suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the economic argument for intellectuai 
property rights (IPRs) followed by a review of studies that seek to assess the 
impact of IPRs on productivity and economic growth. The majority of studies that 
have evaluated the impacts of IPRs, have focused primarily on patents because of 
their long history, predominance and the richness of patent data which easily lends 
itself to empirical analysis. It is only in recent years that there has been a 
movement to analyse the impact of Plant Breeders' Rights (PBR) as weIl as to 
address a number of other issues related to IPRs. These include the role of PBR in 
encouragmg investment in research and development (R&D), enhancing 
productivity, promoting international technology transfer, as weIl as their 
implication for industry structure and performance. This chapter also reviews sorne 
of the PBR impact studies with a view towards understanding the effectiveness of 
PBR regimes in meeting their stated goals and identifying research gaps in the 
literature. Special attention will be given to review Canada's specific PBR studies 
and those related to breeding innovations on wheat, which is the focus of this 
study. 
2.2 The Economic Rationale of Intellectual Property Rights 
Intellectuai property rights (IPRs) give the inventors or owners the legally 
enforceable power to prevent others from using an intellectual creation or to set the 
terms on which it can be used. In most developed countries, the protection of IPRs 
is now a part of the institutional infrastructure that is meant to encourage private 
investments in R&D and create other policy inventives. Throughout history, 
different legal instruments of intellectuai property protection have emerged. 
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Patents, trademarks, copyrights and neighboring rights are the traditional forms of 
IPRs, while ongoing technological change and unique characteristics of certain 
industries have led to additional forms of protection, such as the sui generis 
systems for the protection of integrated computer circuits, database and plant 
varieties. Although stronger protection of IPRs implies trade-offs for a society: the 
increased market power of IPR holders versus the additional incentives in R&D 
and foreign direct investment (FDI), IPRs are widely regarded as raising social 
welfare and are an important tool in economic policymaking (Braga et al. 2000). 
IPRs have three interrelated economic roles, namely to provide incentives for 
innovators, to encourage technology transfer, and to improve societal welfare 
through the provision of improved products and services. 
2.2.1 IP Rs as an Incentive Mechanism 
A free market economy characterized with decentralized decision making, prices 
and private property rights can lead to efficient production and distribution of 
goods and services, yet may fail to maximize social benefits if non rival, partially 
excludable goods exists in the market (Venner, 1997). Public goods have both 
nonrival and nonexcludable characteristics i . Intellectual inventions or creations 
have sorne characteristics of public goods so the cost of reproduction of 
intellectual creation is typically a fraction of the cost of production, which means 
that little revenue will be collected and this will curtail the incentive for investment 
in research. By granting temporary exclusive rights, IPRs are intended to allow 
inventors or owners to set the price above marginal cost to recoup investment costs 
incurred in the development of intellectual creation. In this context, IPRs can serve 
as a second-best optimal solution to the problems created by public goods 
characteristics of knowledge. IPRs could be set such that they stimulate the 
1 A public good can be enjoyed by numerous individuals at the same time (nonrival); once a public good is 
available, denying access to a consumer is prohibitively expensive (nonexcludable). (Byms & Stone, 1992) 
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development of new products and production processes at a socially optimal rate. 
Intellectual Property Rights, especially patents, are considered to play an important 
role in the creation of new knowledge and information as they require the details of 
invention to be disclosed so they can be replicated, which permits follow-on 
innovation. Thus, the economic logic of granting patent protection to the inventor 
is straightforward. If there were no incentives for inventors, it is likely that fewer 
innovations would be developed thereby retarding economic progress (Jaffe and 
Lemer, 2004). While the incentives provided by patents can be strong, empirical 
evidence suggests that the incentives can vary across industries. For certain 
industries, such as pharmaceutical and biotechnology, the use of patents is 
widespread and particular importance is attached to patent protection, with patents 
playing an important role in the innovation process (Taylor and Silberston, 1973; 
Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al. 1987). However, most industries do not find patents 
to be a particularly effective means of appropriating retums from R&D (Braga et 
al., 2000). This may be due to the particular characteristic of pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology products. Once developed, the compounds can be easily imitated in 
the initial stages of the long product cycle unless they are legally protected by 
patents. 
Sometimes, the movement toward stronger patent protection may restrict the 
innovation process rather than stimulate technological and economic progress as 
researchers find it difficult to further enhance a technology without infringing 
upon the rights of patent holders and consequently lowering R&D investment 
(Mazzoleni and Nelson, 1998). Similarly, a term "tragedy of the anti-commons" 
was coined by HelIer (1998) which explained a situation where rational individuals 
collectively waste a given resource by underutilizing it. HelIer and Eisenberg 
(1998) pointed to this situation in biomedical research as the proliferation of IPRs 
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blocks further technology development and prevents useful and affordable 
products from reaching the marketplace thereby contributing to the under 
utilization of scarce resources. 
2.2.2 IPRs as a Technology Transfer Tool 
David (1993, page 1961) pointed out that "IPRs can play a positive role in 
diffusion of knowledge and information". Perhaps a key trade-off with patents is 
that patents are granted in exchange for the publication of the patent claim. In 
exchange for temporary exclusive rights, the owners have an incentive to disclose 
the details of the invention to the public so that anyone can use the information 
from the patent to further develop innovations. Once they expire or are abandoned, 
the intellectual creation becomes part of the public domain. Moreover, there is 
evidence from sorne studies that patents do not effectively deter imitation by rivaIs 
for very long, which means others can use the information to further develop 
innovations in the short term (Mansfield 1986; Levin et al. 1987). 
Internationally, information and technology is diffused through various channels 
such as trade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), internationallicensing agreements 
and technical assistance. For example, a study by Mansfield (1994) showed that 
IPRs affect FDI decisions by inducing more FDI that results in higher knowledge 
spillovers from foreign to domestic markets. Other studies have generally found 
IPRs to have a positive effect on economic growth (Rapp and Rozek, 1990; Gould 
and Gruben, 1996). Another element regarding the role of IPRs in the international 
diffusion of knowledge is the way in which protection affects the vertical 
integration of multinational firms. Surveys have found the IPRs regime of the host 
country to be highly relevant for decisions to invest in R&D, moderately important 
for FDI in manufacturing and of limited relevance for investments in sales and 
distribution outlets (Braga et al. 2000). 
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2.2.3. IPRs and Social Welfare 
It is suggested that stronger protection of IPRs implies trade-offs for the economy 
with the potential effect of increased market power for IPR holders that ought to be 
weighted against the benefits obtained through the additional incentives. In this 
context, one could expect IPR holders to reduce output or sales to support the 
higher monopolistic prices. In sorne IPR-sensitive industries, such as the 
pharmaceutical industry, the IPR impact on prices is apparent. Redwood (1994) 
studied the potential impact of product patents on prices in India and found there 
was a positive range of price increased from 9 to 76% depending on various 
assurnptions on market demand. 
Upon the introduction of Plant Breeders' Rights protection, the concern of many 
countries has been the possibility of priee increases for new plant varieties. Several 
studies have examined the priee effect of IPRs. Lesser (1994) used a hedonic 
pricing model to examine the marginal price with Plant Variety Protection (PVP) 
certificates for soybeans and found the certification contributed only 2.3% to price 
suggesting the monopoly rents were small. Hu et al. (2006) used a system model to 
study the impact of PVP on rice seed priees in China with the seed price of PVP 
varieties increasing by only 0.84 Yuan/kg. Both oftheir findings show prices have 
been affected slightly. 
Considering the trade off of IPRs for social welfare, one could support Stiglitz's 
(1999, page 11) daim that "it is possible that an exeessively strong intellectual 
property regime may actually inhibit the paee of innovation". Consequently, 
concentrated holdings of patents by firms can block market entry and slow the 
pace of economic development. Nevertheless, this is not always the case. Patent 
protections do not prevent competitors or affect imitators from entering the market 
(Mansfield, 1986; Levin et al. 1987). Moreover, Baumol (2002) found that 
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.~ .. competition in a free market is to be regarded as the main cause for economic 
growth as 80% of the economic benefits generated by innovations do not accrue to 
the parties directly or indirectly involved with the innovation. 
2.3 The Impact of IPRs on Economic Growth and Productivity 
Innovation is at the heart of growth models and drives long-run productivity and 
economic growth (Khan and Luintel, 2006). This subsection will primarily 
examine the economic implications ofIPRs (mostly patents)on productivity and 
economic growth. 
2.3.1 IP Rs and R&D Investment 
Evidence shows that the social return to R&D investments are higher than the 
private retums (Griliches, 1984; Mairesse and Sassenou, 1989; Evenson, 1989; 
Aiston et al., 2000). Since induced innovation is necessary for long term economic 
growth, several studies have sought to understand the relationship between IPRs 
(primarily patents) and a firm's decision to invest in R&D. Inthese studies, patents 
play a role in stimulating investment for certain industries such as pharmaceutical, 
chemical and biotechnology industries (Taylor and Silberston 1973, Levin et al. 
1987; Greif, 1987). However, in most other industries this is not the case. 
Mansfield (1986) conducted an empirical study on a random sample of 100 D.S. 
manufacturing firms and found the patent system seemed to have a relatively small 
effect on R&D in most industries except pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Two 
studies in Canada for different periods also found that patents were not so 
important in innovation. Firestone (1971) conc1uded that patents were not playing 
a big role on the decision to invest in a Canadian subsidiary. Baldwin et. al (2002) 
found the relationship between innovation and patent use was much stronger going 
from innovation to patent use than from patent use to innovation as firms and 
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industries that made more intensive use of patents did not tend to produce more 
innovations. In selected studies from several countries (US, Japan India and 
Europe), the findings were not very different from the ab ove studies (Mazzoleni 
and Nelson, 1998; Luthria, 1996). However, in a more recent study by Kanwar and 
Evenson (2003), they used cross-country panel data from 1981-1995 to examine 
the strength of IPRs on innovation and technological change in developing 
countries and their evidence shows that IPRs had a strong positive effect on R&D 
investment expenditures at the economy-wide level. 
Empirical studies about the relationship of IPRs and R&D investment in 
developing countries are relatively few and their approach appears to be narrowly 
focused. In Brazil, a study examined the role of stronger IPRs and found most 
firms would invest more in internaI company research and would improve training 
for their employees if better legal protection were available (Sherwood, 1990). In 
most cases, studies emphasized the inventive effect of IPRs on agricultural R&D 
investment. Dahab (1986) and Mikkelsen (1984) conducted studies of the 
agricultural implements industry respectively in Brazil and Philippines and found 
the utility model 1 (or petty patents) stimulated adaptive inventions in these 
countries. However, Wijk (1995) studied the impact of PBR on R&D in Argentina 
and showed PBR protection seemed to have prevented the decline in R&D for 
soybean and wheat rather than having stimulated additional R&D expenditure. 
Moreover, Louwaars et al. (2005) found no strong empirical evidence from the five 
case study countries that PBR protection had stimulated innovation activities. 
In sum, the evidence on the incentive effect of IPRs on R&D is mixed. While R&D 
is shown to be a highly profitable venture (as shown by the high rates of returns) , 
the incentive effect of IPRs is highly variable across industries. This implies that 
1 Utility models differ from utility patents in three ways: a. they are of shorter duration(4 to 7 years typically); 
b. they are sel dom examined; c. there is little or no inventive step required (Lesser, 1990). 
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R&D may not be an accurate indicator of the impact of IPRs as other factors and 
trends influencing R&D decisions. For biological based R&D such as plant 
breeding, the difficulty of having a proper before-and-after study due to the long 
timeframes of plant breeding and other important developments such as advances 
in modern biotechnology may considerably shift the trend line of R&D (Lesser, 
1997). 
2.3.2 IP Rs and Economic Growth 
In most popular growth models innovation is carried out to make profits on the 
introduction of new products. In the process of new product deve1opment, the 
accumulation of human capital lowers the cost of innovations. The pace of 
economic growth increases with larger stocks of human capital. Thus, by creating 
an environment conducive to the accumulation of human knowledge, IPRs will 
tend to increase innovation, productivity and economic growth (Gould and Gruben, 
1996). 
The role ofIPRs in long-run productivity and economic growth has been examined 
by Gould and Gruben (1996) who found that stronger IPRs corresponded to higher 
economic growth rates in a cross-country sample; a result attributed to the role of 
IPRs in fostering R&D investments. Their findings suggested the linkage between 
IPRs and innovation may play a weaker role in less competitive, highly protected 
markets. Park and Ginarte (1997) examined how patent protections affected 
long-run economic growth and found that stronger IPRs have the potential to 
improve economic growth. But their key finding is that stronger IPRs will not 
contribute to growth directly (by being codified into laws), but indirectly by 
making more investment activities possible, particularly R&D activities. Moreover, 
from their 60 cross-country samples, they found R&D was an important 
determinant of growth rate in both deve10ped and deve10ping countries, while IPR 
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impact for the R&D activities of the developed countries but not for the less 
developed countries. In a recent study, Kwan and Lai (2003) examined the impact 
of IPRs on growth by using an expanding-variety type R&D-based endogenous 
growth model and found that a tightening of IPRs caused a fall in consumption and 
the expansion of R&D investment which led to higher growth of consumption 
following the initial drop. Furthermore, they were able to compute the optimal 
level of IPR by taking into account transitional dynamics. 
According to the studies reviewed on the relationship between IPRs and 
productivity growth, a consensus emerges to suggest that IPRs do have an 
important role in sustaining long run productivity and growth. Moreover, Park and 
Ginarte (1997) showed that IPRs impact growth by fostering R&D investment and 
making R&D investment activities possible. With regard to the relationship 
between R&D investment and productivity, a number of empirical studies found 
that R&D investment contributed to domestic productivity by focusing on the 
manufacturing sector and analyzing firm and industry level cross-sectional data 
(Mansfield, 1988; Griliches and Mairesse, 1990; Hall and Mairesse, 1995). Their 
findings report statistically significant R&D elasticities ranging from 0.1 to 0.2. 
2.4 The Economic Impacts of Plant Breeders' Rights 
Much of the economics literature on IPRs has focused on the relationship between 
patents and productivity growth. It is only in recent years that attention has been 
paid to understanding the impact of other forms of IPRs and the specifie role they 
play in fostering the innovation process. In this subsection we review the literature 
on the impact of Plant Breeder's Rights (PBR) in different countries. Many of the 
studies have concentrated on the United States where IPRs for plant based and 
other biological organisms have been available for a greater period of time. For 
example, plant protection in the United States for asexually propagated plants has 
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been available since 1930; for sexually propagated plants in the form of Plant 
Variety Protection (PVP) since 1970 and since 1980 the landmark case of 
Chakrabarty v Diamond has provided utility patents for living organisms. 
Globally, UPOV l provides a framework for intellectual property protection of 
plant varieties, and the number of countries that grant such rights has grown over 
the years. Furthermore, the types of inventions that can be protected has expanded 
and the scope of protection has been broadened (The World Bank, 2006). 
2.4.1 Impact of Plant Breeders' Rights on R&D Investment 
Does PBR stimulate R&D investment and breeding research? Like patents and 
copyrights for the protection of industrial inventions, PBR, are a second best 
solution for promoting innovation in the agricultural sector. Like patents which are 
intended to stimulate R&D investments, the positive effect expected from PBR is 
to increase R&D by plant breeders for the purposes of developing improved 
agricultural plant varieties. Most empirical work on the R&D effects of IPR for 
plant varieties has been undertaken in the United States and Spain and the amount 
of international research is quite limited. Studies that have examined the effect of 
PBR on R&D inputs in the breeding sector have focused on the R&D expenditures, 
the number of research programs, investment in human resources and output in 
terms of certificates granted for plant varieties. 
Butler and Marion (1985) used survey information and data on certificates to 
examine changes in breeders' behavior after the U.S. PVPA was passed in 1970. 
They found that R&D investments by seed companies increased most rapidly in 
the period leading up to the Act (possibly in anticipation). There is evidence of 
1 UPOV (the Union for the protection of New Varieties of Plants) was established by the International 
Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants. The objective of the Convention is the protection of 
new varieties of plants by an intellectual property rights. 
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increased investment in a few specifie crops (shifted away from corn and toward 
soybeans) and the number of soybean and wheat crop varieties released in the 
1970s increased sharply. Their study shows that the PVPA has had a positive effect 
on private plant breeding R&D for soybeans and wheat. Perrin et al. (1983) 
surveyed seed companies for data on R&D expenditures and found that the PVPA 
has had a positive impact on private research for non-hybrid crops (soybeans and 
cereals). Several studies surveyed investments in financial and human resource 
(scientists) for plant breeding in U.S. (Kalton and Richardson 1983; Kalton et al. 
1989; Frey, 1996), although they did not seek to directly link the changes to the 
PVPA. Venner (1997) analyzed both trends in public and private investments in 
wheat breeding in the United States and found private investments remained 
relatively static while public investments on wheat breeding actually increased 
over the 1970-1993 period. In sum, these studies indicated that privàte sector 
breeding has increased following the PVPA in a limited number of crops. 
Studies in other countries have also found ambiguous effects of PBR on plant 
breeding investment. Wijk (1995) reported the PBR impact in Argentina and found 
PBR protection prevented the reduction in R&D expenditure for soybean and 
wheat rather than having stimulated additional R&D. Moreover, from their 
findings, the increase in R&D expenditure by multinational seed companies seems 
not related to PBR enforcement but rather from the incentive of changes in 
economic policies. However, Diez (2002) examined the impact of PBR in Spain 
and found that PBR had a positive incentive for private sectors to have increased 
its market share because of higher appropriability conditions. In Canada, there had 
been almost a three-fold increase in investment in the private sector in both 
horticulture and agriculture industries since the passage of PBR and the public 
sector were able to partially fund their plant breeding programs from the royalties 
earned from seed sales (CFIA, 2001). 
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It seems that PBR did have sorne effects in agricultural and breeding research in 
both industrialized and developing countries, however, the effectiveness of PBR 
was still inconclusive. One possible explanation is that it is difficult to draw firm 
conclusions on the effect of PBR because of other factors (such as market 
developments and other policies) influencing R&D decisions. Lesser (1997) 
pointed out the difficulty of having a proper before-and-after study was due to the 
long time it takes to develop new crop varieties. 
2.4.2 Impacts on Output and Productivity 
From a policy and social welfare perspective, it may be more important that the 
PBR Act has a positive impact on the outputs of R&D, such as a more productive 
variety or a variety with enhanced quality attributes. Lesser (1997) points out that 
whether PBR legislation leads to improved varieties or only cosmetically 
improved ones is an unanswered question. 
Although the most common measure of productivity in agriculture is yield (output 
per unit of land), improved varieties could also be input or cost saving (for 
example, herbicide tolerant crops and better pest resistant crops that save on labor) 
and quality enhancing (for example, crops with higher nutritional content). Since 
useful data on these aspects except yield is limited, previous studies examined the 
effect of PBR on crop yields for different kinds of crops. 
Perrin et al. (1983) examined the yields of soybean varieties in yield test plots in 
North Carolina, Iowa and Louisiana. By testing the trend in variety improvement 
and examining the effects of whether the variety was released before or after 1970 
on the yields observed, they found a positive trend of 0.12 bu/acre per year 
improvement after 1970, yet this trend is significant only at a 16 percent level of 
significance. However, Lesser (1997) argued that this is a fairly weak test because 
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of the limited number of protected varieties and suggested such analysis should be 
repeated with more recent and comprehensive data. Babcock and Foster (1991) 
measured the impact of PVP to flue-cured tobacco yield in North Carolina from 
1954-1987 using a time index variable to separate genetic and nongenetic 
influences on yield and found no evidence that the PVPA had discernable effect on 
the development of higher yielding flue-cured tobacco varieties. Aiston and 
Venner (2002) tested the effects of the PVPA on commercial wheat yields and 
experimental wheat yields for a number of states. They found that the PVPA had 
no statistically significant effect on both commercial and experimental wheat 
yields. For the case of Canada, Carew and Devadoss (2003) quantified the 
contribution of PBR to canola yields in the province of Manitoba and their results 
revealed that PBR had a positive and statistically significant effect on canola yields. 
Another positive result was found by Naseem et al. (2005), who investigated the 
effect of PVP varieties on cotton yields in the U.S. and they found that there has 
been an increase in the number of new varieties released annually since the PVPA 
and their econometric evidence indicated that PVP had an overall positive effect on 
cotton yields. 
The evidence from these studies were inconclusive in terms of contributions to 
agricultural productivity from IPR for plant variety protection. Since most of these 
studies were from the United States, there is need to replicate these kinds of studies 
for more crops. On the other hand, it is difficult to hypothesize why the results 
measuring the effects of PVPA on crop yields differed between these studies. One 
possible reason is that among the studies investigated, researchers employed 
different crop types, data sources and estimation methods. 
2.4.3 Impacts on International Technology Transfer 
Like patents which have a positive effect on the diffusion of knowledge and 
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information, the implementatidn of PBR laws is also expected to create the 
incentive to promote technology transfer and knowledge spillover. If PBR does 
facilitate the transfer of plant varieties between countries, there would be 
significant flows of varieties across countries. However, empirical studies on the 
economic impacts of PBR to facilitate the transfer of technology and international 
diffusion have been quite limited. 
The only available empirical study in this area is from Srinivasan (2004) and he 
examined the transferability effect of PVP in facilitating the flow of varieties 
across countries by three ways: transfer of protected varieties by crop across 
UPOV member countries, foreigners' share ofPVP certificates and determinants of 
foreign participation in PVP. He found that the strength of a IPR regime 
significantly influences PVP grants but the transferability effect of PVP across 
countries (mostly developed countries) has been limited. The determinants of 
foreigners' participation in a PVP system showed that it was not only influenced by 
the strength of IPRs, but also by other factors (for example, the size of market and 
openness of the economy). Moreover, most transfers of protected varieties have 
been within a limited number of EU countries and have been facilitated by special 
features of the seed regulatory system. 
Though this evidence was not conclusive about the transferability and diffusion 
effect of PBR, it does reveal that PBR induces positive response from foreigners 
seeking to protect their plant varieties, thus PBR plays a role in affecting 
investment and research. 
2.4.4 Impacts on Distribution of Benefits and Industry Structure 
PBRs, like other IPR instruments, imply a trade-off: stronger protection of IPRs 
would increase market power of IPR holders and probably induce them to reduce 
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output or sales in order to support higher monopolistic priees. From an economic 
perspective, this issue is about the redistribution of welfare benefits accompanying 
the introduction of new production technology in the form of improved varieties. 
To examine the distribution of benefits, one way is to analyze the price of 
improved seed varieties and compare any margin over existing varieties; another 
way is to examine the distribution of benefits between farmers, consumers and the 
seed sector (Eaton, 2002). However, no existing literature has examined the 
distribution of benefits between farmers, consumers and the seed sector 
specifically for PBRs. 
If there are monopoly powers in the hands of seed suppliers as a result ofPBR, one 
could expect excessive margins on the prices of protected varieties. Lesser (1994) 
used econometric techniques (hedonic pricing mode1) to examine the marginal 
price associated with PVP eertificates for soybean in New York State. Exc1uding 
other factors, he found evidence of 2.3% price increase associated with soybean 
varieties with PVP and conc1uded that U.S. PVP protected varieties were very 
similar associated with small monopoly rents. Another study was conducted in 
China, after it passed the PVP Act in 1997. Hu et al. (2006) used a system model to 
study the impact of PVP on rice seed prices in three big rice provinces from 
1999-2002 and they found PVP does not show much impact on seed price. The 
PVP protected varieties increased seed priee by only 0.84 Yuan/kg over non-PVP 
varieties. Lesser (1997) provided sorne explanations for the low monopoly rents: 
the reduced appropriability due to farmer-saved seed competition and the 
important role of public sector breeding programs. 
Lesser (1998) indicated the impact of IPRs on the industry structure concentration 
in the agricultural biotechnology is contradictory. Sorne evidence showed that 
IPRs strengthened the incentive to invest which provides greater opportunities to 
28 
larger firms and enhanced concentration (Phillips 1966; Mansfield 1962). However, 
other studies indicated that innovation contained deconcentration as well by 
finding entrant firms have a greater incentive to initiate radical innovation (Gort 
and Klepper, 1982; Winter 1984). 
In the agricultural biotechnology industry, IPRs are changing the industry structure 
and the 1990s have witnessed acceleration in the process of consolidation in the 
agricultural biotechnology industry (Wright and Pardey 2006; Srinivasan 2003). 
The development of a new plant variety may require access not only to existing 
varieties protected by PBR but also to biotechnology processes or research tools 
that may be protected by patents held by several different companies. Thus, 
industry consolidation can permit the control of IPRs over relevant technologies 
that can provide secure access to technologies and reduce transaction costs. 
The empirical evidence about the PBR effect on industry concentration is 
extremely limited. The only available study is from Srinivasan (2003), who studied 
the concentration in ownership of plant variety rights for six major crops in 30 
UPOV member countries. Using the CR-lO ratio and the CR-4 1 ratio as the 
measure of concentration, he found several results: first, concentration in the 
ownership of PBR grants was high at the level of individual countries; second a 
very large proportion of grants was held by a limited number of large multinational 
seed companies; third, the overall concentration was less in crops where the public 
sector plays an important role in plant breeding such as wheat, soybean, the degree 
of concentration for these crops is much less than it is in maize and oilseed rape; 
fourth, concentration came resulted from the mergers and acquisitions; and finally 
concentration corresponded closely to concentration in the market share for seed. 
1 CR-4 ratio: the sum of the market shares of the top four firms. Ifthe CR-4 ratio is less than 40%, the industry 
is considered to be competitive; a CR-4 ratio of 40-60% represents moderate to high levels of concentration. 
See more details on (Schmalensee and Willig, 1989). 
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His findings showed that the remarkable process of consolidation of the seed 
industry in the developed world had resulted in significantly concentrated 
ownership of PVP grants at the country level. 
The relationship of IPRs and entry barriers is also an important area of study in the 
literature. There were concerns that concentration of IPRs by firms may create 
entry barriers and IPRs may play an additional role in limiting entry into the 
agricuiturai biotechnology sector (Lesser 1997; Lesser 1998). However, empirical 
studies examining the role of PBR on industry entry barriers have been quite 
sparse. The available studies examined the impact of patents protection on market 
entry in agricultural biotechnology industry. Barton (1998) found the use ofbroad 
patents such as the biological pesticide of Bt tended to force all competitors out of 
the market. Lesser (1998) indicated that patents and other factors (threat of 
litigation, materiai transfer agreements) can be used to deter market entry and 
indirectly accelerate concentration. 
IPRs such as PBR are complex in the agricultural and plant breeding industry. 
Though theoretically PBR are considered to reduce competition and lead to more 
monopoly rents paid to breeders, empirical evidence found no consistent results by 
showing price of protected varieties increased slightly and the monopoly rents 
were modestly small. With regard to the impacts on industry structure, PBR seems 
to have significant structure impacts by encouraging industry concentration 
through mergers and acquisitions; however, the specific role of PBR in market 
entry is still inconclusive. 
2.5 The 1990 Canadian PBR Act 
Amongst developed countries, the Canadian PBR Act is relatively new having 
been enacted in 1990. One of the requirements of the Act requires the Canadian 
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Food Inspection Agency to review the impacts of the Act and the performance of 
the PBR system in general in meeting the stated goals of the Act. The CFIA 
reviewed the impact of the PBR system on crop yield and R&D investment for 
both agricultural (e.g., canola, wheat) and horticultural crops. 
The CFIA review examined the activities related to PBR applications and rights 
granted with sorne interesting results. The key findings of the review are 
mentioned in chapter one in the introductory part of the thesis. That is: investments 
from the private sector increased; access to foreign varieties by growers improved; 
and the development of improved varieties increased. However, as we have 
discussed before, the finding of the review is inconclusive for several reasons. First, 
most of the information from the data is based on the opinions of industry 
representatives. Thus, this information could be subjective and not reliable. Second, 
the findings are mostly qualitative and are not rigorous and may not reflect the real 
impact. 
With regard to the relationship of the PBR Act and public research investment, 
Carew (2000) studied the implications of evolving IPRs in Canada for the canola 
sector and public sector research. He found the majority of the certificates were 
granted to cano la, potato and soybean with fewer certificates to wheat and barley, 
which was consistent with the findings of the CFIA review. Moreover, he 
concluded that canola attracts more private plant breeding investment because of 
the great profit potential for private industry (for example, the potential for genetic 
improvements such as hybrid varieties; the responsiveness of canola to genetic 
manipulation such as doubled haploids from microspores, tissue culture, protoplast 
fusion and gene transfer). 
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2.6 The Impact of Plant Breeders' Rights on Wheat 
Unlike those hybrid crops such as canola, wheat is an open-pollinated crop and the 
varieties of open-pollinated varieties are homozygous which me ans the genotypes 
remain virtually unchanged across generations (Venner, 1997). Thus, if farmers 
save and replant seed from a previous harvest, the agronomic performance will 
typically be the same for the open-pollinated varieties and this poses a negative 
impact for breeders or owners as they can only receive partial royalties partially. 
Using the technology ofhybridization, breeders can secure the economic property 
rights to a portion of the attributes in the improved characteristics of the variety 
(the agronomic performance is considerably lower in the second round of a 
hybridized variety). Nevertheless, Eaton (2006) pointed out that for many 
open-pollinated food crops such as wheat, rice and soybeans, either the technique 
of hybridization has not been successful or it entails costs that exceed the income 
stream that can be obtained from the additional attributes. Therefore, it is likely 
that the unique characteristics of wheat as an open-pollinated crop can cause sorne 
difficulty of capturing rents for plant breeders and thereby reduce the incentives for 
R&D. 
One the other hand, Carew (2000) indicated that the stringent quality parameters 
for wheat imposed by the Canadian Wheat Board and the Canadian Grain 
Commission tend to restrict genetic modification within the Western Red Spring 
wheat c1ass and since this wheat c1ass dominates the Canadian market, it 
discourages private investment for wheat. 
Likewise, besides examining the PVPA effect on wheat productivity and 
investment in the U.S., Venner (1997) aiso provided a comprehensive study of the 
effect of PVPA on the adoption of varieties with PVP certificates, wheat seed price 
and grain quality. He indicated the commercial failure ofhybrid wheat and the less 
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than expected appropriation from protected varieties both discouraged private 
investment. Yet he pointed out that the adoption of varieties with PVP certificates 
have increased for both private and public varieties, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that PVPA increased the share of wheat acreage to private varieties. 
Furthermore, his result showed that PVPA did not appear to have significantly 
increased wheat seed and grain quality. In SUffi, he concluded that PVPA have not 
contributed to higher yields of wheat varieties and did not increase private sector 
investment in wheat breeding, but rather served as a marketing tool to boost the 
share of what acreage to private varieties. 
Since previous studies found the different effects ofthe PBR Act on crop yield, it is 
possible that the effect of the PBR Act varies among different crops. As no 
empirical study has investigated the economic effect of the PBRAct on other crops 
except canola in Canada, there is need to replicate the U.S. study to examine the 
effect on wheat in Canada. Furthermore, wheat is different from canola with its 
open-pollinated characteristics which may discourage incentives to investment. 
Thus there is a need to examine empirically the relationship between PBR Act and 
wheat productivity to have a better understanding of the economic effect of the· 
PBR Act in Canada. 
2.7 Current Issues around PBR in Canada 
Lesser (1997) indicated that there is still a lack of economic research studying the 
intellectual property protection for plant varieties and this applies to research in 
both industrialized and developing countries. Although the Canadian PBR Act was 
enacted in 1990, it has never been without controversy. Mostly the debates are 
about what aspects of the PBR regime should be further strengthened since the 
CUITent Canadian PBR Act adheres to the 1978 UPOv. 
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Perhaps the most controversial issue is how to address the "farmers' privilege". 
The 1978 UPOV Convention assurned that farmers are perrnitted to save and reuse 
seed ofprotected varieties for private and non commercial use. However, the 1991 
UPOV Convention limits "farmer's privilege" by stating that on-farm seed saving 
is not permitted without the consent of the breeders though the conditions may 
vary according to member states. Moreover, the 1991 Convention prohibits any 
transfer of seed of protected varieties between farrners (The World Bank:, 2006). 
However, the "farmers' privilege" is not explicitly stated in the 1990 Act in Canada. 
Thus the current PBR Act would not exempt farrners from obtaining authorization 
from the holder of the rights before they sell seed produced from a protected 
variety as a seed for planting. This may probably weaken the intellectual property 
protection for breeders and may further reduce the incentives for investment. Plant 
Breeders' Rights arnendments have been discussed by different stakeholders, the 
Canadian seed industry, the Western Canadian Wheat Growers Association, the 
Plant Breeders' Rights Office and representatives from horticulture and agriculture 
industries. These industry representatives are trying to bring the PBR Act into 
compliance with the 1991 UPOV Convention in terms of extending the protection 
period and rights to conditioning, exporting and importing propagation materials; 
and allowing one year sale prior to application coupled with allowing commercial 
sales while the application is pending (Canadian Food Inspection Agency, 2002). 
Specifically, with regard to the restriction of "farmer's privilege", the 
recommendation is to explicitly state that a plant breeder's rights do not extend to 
" the conditioning and use of harvested material of the plant variety by a farmer on 
the farmer's holdings for subsequent reproduction by the farmer of the plant 
variety on the farmer's holdings" so that farmers are permitted to plant the 
harvested material on any land the farmers may subsequently own or rent (Western 
Canadian Wheat Growers Association, 2005). However, opposite voices from 
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farmers argue that the proposed change taking away farmers' rights to save, reuse 
and exchange seeds will criminalize the age-old customary practices of farmers. 
By giving seed companies additional years of royalties, it is a costly blow to 
farmers but a profit windfall for those seed companies (The Star-Phoenix, 2004). 
With regard to breeder's exemption, it is even more controversial. Critics state that 
this would allow transfer of a gene construct to a protected variety with no 
ownership rights and should be limited in light of technological advances (Lesser, 
2005). To prevent its negation of variety rights, the 1991 Convention adds the 
limitation on "essentially derived varieties (EDV)" for breeder's exemption. Vnder 
the 1991 Convention, EDV cannot be exploited in certain circumstances without 
permission of the person or entity that holds the rights to the original variety. In 
Canada's proposed amendments of the PBR Act, it considers the EDV will 
strengthen the PBR Act without limiting the breeders' exemption and as a 
consequence provide compensation to the original inventor (Carew, 2000). 
However, Lesser and Mutschler (2004) examined the current dependent variety 
system and found it to be unworkable probably because ofthe function ofPBR as 
protecting the entire plant but not specifie traits. Moreover, it is feared that sorne 
large companies would monopolize certain gene pools (ISF, 2005). 
Regarding those controversial issues surrounding the PBR Act, the debate needs to 
be better informed in terms of evaluating what the impacts have been thus far. 
That's the motivation and objective ofthis study. 
2.8 Summary 
In this section, three topics were reviewed. First, three interrelated economic roles 
of IPRs (patents) were examined: to provide incentives for innovators, to 
encourage technology transfer, and to improve welfare through the provision of 
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improved products. In this part, an overview of the relationship between IPRs and 
growth and productivity was aiso studied with the consensus that IPRs had a 
positive role on long run growth and productivity. The second part discussed the 
economic impact of PBR from different perspectives: the impact on R&D 
investment was still inconclusive; the effect on output and crop productivity varied 
among different countries; the impact on international technology transfer was 
positive as to its impact on R&D investment, but it needs further examination; the 
impact on welfare and the distribution of benefits indicated low monopoly rents 
went to seed suppliers; and the impact on the industry structure showed significant 
concentration in the agricultural industry but inconclusive on the market entry. In 
the third part, the Canadian PBR Act and wheat PBR studies were highlighted 
along with the CUITent controversies sUITounding the PBR Act in Canada. 
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Chapter 3: Data and Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
Has the Canadian Plant Breeders' Rights Act (PBR Act) led to improved varieties 
(higher-yielding) as claimed in the 2001 review of the Act by the Canadian Food 
Inspection Agency? As indicated in the Chapter 1, the evidence in support of the 
productivity effect ofPBR is uncertain in light ofthe fact that the observable gains 
in wheat yields in western Canada appear to fluctuate or weaken, just when they 
might have been expected to have increased as a result of the PBR Act. In this 
chapter we de scribe our empirical methodology to test the relationship between the 
PBR Act and wheat productivity in Canada. Two models are developed: one tests 
the relationship at the aggregate level using data from Canada's western provinces 
while the other uses more detailed varietal level data for the province of Alberta. 
Before describing the models we first review previous research to discuss the 
factors influencing wheat yields and present a conceptual framework to examine 
the relationship between wheat yield, PBR and other explanatory variables. In the 
sections that foIlow, the data and the models used are described. 
3.2 Previous Research 
Much of the previous literature has used yield functions to examine the effects of 
production inputs and environmental factors on crop yields (Offutt et al, 1987; 
Dixon, 1994; Yang et al, 1992). GeneraIly, linear yield functions have been 
preferred over nonlinear models to estimate the effect of climate and technology on 
crop yields. Sorne previous research combines an index of varietal improvement 
with econometric analyses to examine the determinants of experimental wheat 
yields (Feyerherm et al., 1988; Babcock and Foster 1991). 
Of aIl the factors that have been considered to explain wheat yield, production 
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inputs such as fertilizer are consistently the most significant variable explaining 
the variation in wheat yield (Bell et al. 1995; Traxler et al, 1995; Edwards and 
Furtan 1998). Environmental factors such as soil condition, herbicide and climatic 
conditions have also been shown to affect crop yields. F eyerherm and Paulsen 
(1981), Burt (1995), Teigen and Thomas (1995) and Venner (1997) employed 
weather variables in their experimental and commercial wheat yield models. In 
Canada, Campbell et al. (1988) and Campbell et al. (1997a) used precipitation and 
temperature variables in their experimental yield model for red spring wheat in 
western Canada. The results from their studies showed temperature and 
precipitation explained the variation in spring and Durum wheat yields. Other 
studies also found interaction terms between nitrogen and precipitation, 
temperature and precipitation were positive and significant variables impacting 
wheat yield (Burt 1995; Teigen and Thomas 1995). 
While physical inputs and environmental factors are clearly important factors 
affecting yields, institutional and market forces can also affect productivity. Crop 
prices are expected to increase the value of the marginal product of inputs since 
they are expected to stimulate crop planting and thereby lead growers to apply 
greater quantities of variable inputs. Institutional factors, such as the PBR Act, are 
expected to contribute to higher crop productivity as the PBR Act is expected to 
induce private R&D in plant breeding and thus lead to more productive varieties 
with varietal improvements. The impact of the PBRAct on output and productivity 
has been discussed in the literature review. In this section, we focus on different 
methodologies employed to test the impact of PBR Act on crop productivity. 
Venner (1997) for example examined the relationship of the PVPA on wheat yields 
by employing commercial and experimental yield functions. For the commercial 
wheat yield model, after controlling for other environmental and input factors, 
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Venner used the share of acreage sown to wheat varieties with PVP Certificates to 
test their effects coupled with an intercept dummy variable to test for structural 
break effects after the passage of the PVPA. Similarly, Carew and Devadoss (2003) 
tested the effects of the PBR Act on canola yields in Canada by using the share of 
seeded area of varieties with PBRs and included a dummy variable to measure the 
structural change effect after the passage of PBR Act. But unlike Venner's single 
yield equation, Carew and Devadoss (2003) applied panel data models to test the 
relationship of the PBR Act on canola yields which also compared the estimates 
from the covariance model (fixed effects) and random effects model. Likewise, 
Naseem et al (2005) applied a panel data models to examine cotton yields in the 
United States and they included other explanatory variables such as the interaction 
term ofthe share ofPVP varieties and a trend term to quantify whether this form of 
varietal protection affected yield. 
The three studies investigated the impact of the PBR ActlPVPA on crop yields but 
with different results. This may be attributed partly to different estimation 
approaches adopted coupled with the use of varied data sets and levels of data 
aggregation. The results from Carew and Devadoss (2003) and Naseem et al. 
(2005) showed positive impacts, while Venner's (1997) results did not. One 
possible explanation is that panel data models used by Carew and Devadoss (2003) 
and Naseem et al. (2005) can better control for the unobservable individual effects 
for temporal and spatial crop yield data. In addition, as the three studies examined 
different crops (wheat, canola and cotton), it is possible that the PBR Act has 
different impacts on different crops. 
3.3 Conceptual Framework 
Based on our hypothesis that the adoption of wheat varieties qualifying for Plant 
Breeders' Rights has increased overall wheat yields and rate ofyield increase, it is 
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possible to test this hypothesis at different levels of aggregation: the impact on 
wheat yields for four provinces in western Canada and the impact on wheat yields 
for the province of Alberta where different wheat classes and soil zones are 
considered in the analyses. 
Based on the evidence from previous studies, there is an advantage in using panel 
data models comprising time series and cross sectional data. However, the use of 
panel data models is limited by the nature of our data. While the western Canada 
and Alberta wheat yield data contain both time series and cross sections, they are 
not suitable for panel data analysis. For example, the wheat data for western 
Canada (Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia) consisted of 135 
observations for five wheat classes (Western Red Spring, Durum, Western Red 
Winter, Extra Strong and Soft White Spring) over a nine year period. This three 
dimensional data (class, province, year) set did not satisfy the data configuration 
required for a panel data analysis. When separated by wheat class, the numbers of 
observations for each class are 36 (Western Red Spring), 26 (Durum), 27 (Western 
Red Winter), 27 (Extra Strong) and 19 (Soft White Spring). For the Alberta data, 
the yield covers the individual variety level for five wheat classes in eight soil 
zones over a five year period (199-2003). Similarly, the Alberta data were limited 
for a panel data analysis by also having three dimensions (variety, soil zone and 
year). As a result of these data limitations, alternative estimation approaches were 
investigated. 
Following Venner (1997), we adopt a yield response function for the wheat yield 
study in western Canada and Alberta. In equation (3.1), yield ofwheat class c in 
province s in year t (I::st)' depends on whether a variety is protected by PBR 
( ~st)' the quantities of production inputs (Xst )' and climatic variables 
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(precipitation, temperature) (~t)' In addition to these quantitative factors, 
qualitative factor (M) such as provincial dummy variables is included. 
(3.1) 
For Alberta wheat yield data, the response function will be a modified version of 
equation (3.1). The yield ofwheat variety i in each class in soil zone r in year 
t dependson the number or share of varieties qualifying for PBR (~rt)' the 
quantities of production inputs (X
rt ), and climatic factors such as the precipitation 
and temperature (Wrt ). Likewise, sorne qualitative factors (M ) such as variety and 
soil zone dummy variables are included in the function. 
Y;rt = f(~rt,Xirt'~rt,M) (3.2) 
The main difference between the two yield response functions is that equation (3.1) 
examines the relationship between wheat yields at the provincial level and 
associated factors influencing them while equation (3.2) studies the relationship 
between wheat yields at the individual variety level in each class and factors 
influencing them. The strength of the equation (3.1) is that it investigates the wheat 
yields in western Canada where 97% of the wheat is grown while the strength of 
equation (3.2) is that it examines the variety wheat yield for different wheat classes. 
The disadvantage is that both models are single equations, without considering 
temporal and spatial aspects of the data. Consequently, the unobserved individual 
effects are not well accounted for in the wheat yield functions. In the next section, 
we specify the empirical models for both equations and describe the data 
employed. 
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3.4 Empirical Model for Western Canada and Data Description 
3.4.1 Wheat Yield Madel for Western Canada 
A linear empirical wheat yield model is developed for wheat yie1d in western 
Canada to identify the re1ationship between wheat yields and explanatory variables 
such as share of acreage devoted to varieties qualifying for PBR rights, production 
inputs, regional influences and environmental factors. 
Yieldcst = Po + P1PBRcst + P2NPBRest + P3prieees(t_1) + P4precipitationst 
+P5temperaturest + P6Acrecst + IP 7M +sest 
Where 
Yieldcst = the average yield ofwheat for a given wheat c1ass c in province sand 
in year t, measured by bushe1 per acre 
Areacst = the total area planted to the c1ass of wheat c in province s In year t, 
measured by 1,000 acres 
P BRest = the share of wheat acreage sown to varieties with PBR rights for a given 
wheat c1ass c in province s in year t 
NP BRest = the share of the number of PBR varieties for a give wheat c1ass c in 
province s in year t 
priee = the producer price of wheat for wheat c1ass c In year t-1 
cs(t-l) 
~ 
precipitationst = sum of precipitation from May 1 st to July 31 st for se1ected stations 
in wheat growing areas in province s in year t 
temperaturest = sum of daily mean temperature minus 5 degrees from May 1 st to 
Aug 31 st in selected weather stations for wheat growing areas in 
province s in year t 
Met = qualitative dummy variables such as provincial dummy variables and 
wheat c1ass dummy variables 
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3.4.2 Description ofWheat Data in Western Canada 
Summary statistics for the data used in the wheat yield functions in western 
Canada are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics of Wheat Data in Western Canada (1998-2006) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Yield 135 41.48 14.82532 20 107 
Area 135 1507.689 2574.403 5 10700 
PBR 135 21.31333 26.05152 0 86.4 
NPBR 135 0.196126 0.202443 0 0.833 
Price 135 5.292219 0.803542 3.948 7.300457 
Precipitation 135 187.6754 45.74514 107.9889 309.68 
Temperature 135 1243.559 145.6988 955.48 1472.02 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998-2006), Canadian Wheat Board (1998-2006) 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency PBR Office (2006a), Environment Canada (1998-2006) 
There are eight classes ofwheat grown in Canada and their respective end uses are 
in parentheses: Western Red Spring (pan bread, alone or blends for hearth bread, 
steamed bread, noodles, fiat bread, common wheat pasta), Western Red Winter 
(French breads, fiat breads, steamed breads, noodles), Western Extra Strong 
(blending and used in specialty products when high gluten strength is needed), 
Prairie Spring Red (hearth breads, fiat breads, steamed breads, noodles), Prairie 
Spring White (fiat breads, noodles, chapattis), Western Amber Dururn (Semolina 
for pasta and couscous), Western Soft White Spring (cookies, cakes, pastry, fiat 
breads, noodles, steamed breads, chapattis) and Western Hard white Spring (bread 
and noodle production) (Canadian Grain Commission, 2007). However, due to 
data availability, only five classes of the wheat yield data were analyzed in the four 
western provinces: Western Red Spring (WRS), Western Amber Dururn (Dururn), 
Western Red Winter (WRW), Western Extra Strong (WES), and Western Soft 
White Spring (WSWS). 
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Table 2 shows the number of wheat varieties protected by PBRs for each wheat 
class. Wheat varieties belonging to WRS wheat class had the largest number of 
varieties that were protected by Plant Breeders' Rights. Wheat varieties belonging 
to other wheat classes had a relatively smaller number of varieties that were 
granted Plant Breeders' Rights. The smaller share of PBR varieties for WRW and 
WES wheat classes may reflect the smaller area seeded to these wheat varieties in 
western Canada. 
Table 2: Number ofVarieties and PBR Varieties planted in Western Canada (1998-2006) 
Year WRS PBRWRS Durum PBR Durum WES PBRWES WRW PBRWRW 
1998 23 5 7 2 4 0 4 0 
1999 27 7 10 4 4 0 4 0 
2000 28 7 9 3 6 7 0 
2001 28 7 9 3 6 6 0 
2002 29 6 9 3 7 8 0 
2003 31 10 10 4 8 1 12 1 
2004 32 11 10 4 8 1 12 1 
2005 29 16 10 4 10 1 13 2 
2006 30 20 7 6 10 1 13 2 
Source: Canadian Wheat Board (1998-2006) and 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency PBR Office (2006a) 
Note: WRS: variety numbers of Western Red Spring wheat; 
PBR WRS: varieties numbers of Western Red Spring Wheat with Plant Breeders' Rights; 
WES: variety numbers of Western Extra Strong wheat; 
PBR WES: variety numbers of Western Extra Strong wheat with Plant Breeders' Rights; 
WRW: variety numbers of Western Red Winter wheat; 
PBR WRW: variety numbers of Western Red Winter wheat with Plant Breeders' Rights. 
There were no PBR varieties in the WSWS wheat class. 
With regard to the yield performance in each province, Figures 7 to Il shows the 
annual wheat yield for the five wheat classes in western Canada. For each class, 
wheat yields varied among provinces. Yields fluctuated during 1998-2006 except 
for WSWS wheat. Since no varieties had PBRs in that class, the increase in yield 
can not be attributed to the PBR Act. 
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Figure 7: Annual Wheat Yield of Western Red Spring Wheat (1998-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998-2006) 
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Figure 8: Annual Wheat Yield of Western Amber Durum Wheat (1998-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998-2006) 
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Figure 9: Annual Wheat Yield of Western Red Winter Wheat (1998-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998-2006) 
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Figure 10: Annual Wheat Yield of Western Extra Strong Wheat (1998-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998-2006) 
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Figure Il: Annual Wheat Yield of Western Soft White Spring Wheat (1998-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998-2006) 
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Figure 12: Seeded Acreage by Wheat Class in Western Canada (1998-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998-2006) 
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Figure 12 illustrates the seeded acre age for the five wheat classes in Alberta, 
Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Of the five classes, WRS wheat is the large st 
category of wheat grown, followed by Durum, while the acreages of WES, WRW 
and WSWS are relatively small in each province. 
Besides the PBR, yield and seeded area data, other production input and climate 
data were coUected during 1998-2006. The quantity of production inputs is usuaUy 
measured by the average quantity of fertilizer applied, yet it is not available at the 
provinciallevel for wheat. Thus a proxy to represent aU other production inputs is 
the average producer priee of wheat in the previous harvest year (priee ) as 
/-1 
higher previous wheat priees lead profit-maximizing wheat growers to apply 
greater quantities of variable inputs (Venner, 1997). Figure 13 shows the producer 
wheat priees for the five wheat classes in western Canada. Priees were not stable 
for these years and Durum wheat reported the highest producer priees. 
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Figure 13: Producer Wheat Prices in Western Canada (1997-2005) 
Source: Canada Wheat Board (1997-2005) 
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The model also includes weather variables to explain the variation in wheat yields 
as previous studies indicated precipitation and temperature did affect wheat yields 
in western Canada (Campbell et al., 1988 and Campbell et al. 1997a). The sum of 
precipitation form May 1 st to July 31 st will be the proxy ofthe precipitation factors 
as Campbell et al. (1988) found growing season precipitation was more effective in 
explaining spring wheat yields. The proxy of the temperature factor is the sum of 
mean daily air temperature minus 5 degree Celsius from the period May 1 st to 
August 31 st (Campbell et al., 1997a). 
Environment Canada compiled detailed precipitation and temperature data from 
several stations by province. The daily temperature and monthly precipitation 
employed in this study were average observations from selected weather stations 
in wheat growing areas for each province. Figure 14 shows the major wheat 
growing are as in western Canada. British Columbia has a smaller wheat growing 
area, while for Alberta, Manitoba and Saskatchewan; most of the wheat growing 
are as are in the southern part of these provinces. Climatic data (precipitation, 
temperature) was collected from weather stations in the wheat growing areas of 
western Canada. Figures 15 and 16 show the trend of precipitation and temperature 
in each province. 
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Figure 14: Map ofWheatArea Distribution in Canada 
Source: United States Department of Agriculture (2004) 
~~, ), ~.......". X-
", 
1998 1999 20002001 2002 20032004 20052006 
-+-Alberta 
---II- British Columbia 
Manitoba 
Saskatchewan 
Figure 15: Sum of Precipitation from May to July (1998-2006) 
Source: Environment Canada (1998-2006) 
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Figure 16: Sum of Daily Temperature from May to August (1998-2006) 
Source: Environment Canada (1998-2006) 
3.4.3 Estimation methods 
To capture the effects of the PBR Act, two measures are employed. The first 
method involves the variable P BRest by testing the effect of the share of planted 
acreages devoted to PBR varieties. The second measure tests the effect of the share 
of the number of PBR varieties to aIl wheat varieties using variable NP BRest' A 
finding of a positive and significant coefficient on P BRest or NP BRest will be 
indicative that the adoption of PBR varieties has increased wheat yields. 
A number of preliminary regressions are tried for the model specification. 
Functional forms (log-linear, linear-quadratic) of the wheat yield function are 
exarnined to evaluate models that satisfy the goodness of fit standard. Models with 
log linear terms prove to be unsatisfactory since many observations of the 
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variables P BRest' NP BRest are 0 and were thus dropped, while several variables 
are statistically insignificant. Thus, the linear-quadratic model is employed for 
estimation. 
Qualitative Provincial variables are likely to capture soil quality factors that are 
likely to affect yield. Since the provincial variable M is dichotomous, one of 
them must be dropped to avoid collinearity problem. In this case, one of the four 
provincial dummies should be dropped. The STATA software package is employed 
to analyze the pooled data with provincial dummies and by default it automatically 
drops one of them. 
As the two PBR variables,PBRest and NPBRest are likely to be collinear, we test 
for evidence of multicollinearity. And the correlation coefficient between the two 
variables is 0.86, which indicates the presence of multicollinearity between these 
two variables. Thus, the two variables will be included in separate models to avoid 
multicollinearity. 
Since the time series and cross section data are analyzed by pooled regression, the 
error term may not have a constant variance and therefore heteroskedasticity may 
be a problem. We tested for it in STATA and it did exist, so the robust corrections 
were made for these regressions. 
Results of empirical analysis will be presented later in the next chapter. 
3.4.4 Plant Breeders' Rights on Public Wheat Varieties 
As mentioned in chapter1, there were 102 wheat applications during 1992 to 2006, 
but only 52 were granted Plant Breeders' Rights. Of wheat PBR applications, 
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Canadian public applications! comprise about 58%. Figures 17 and 18 illustrate 
the relationship between applications and rights granted for both public and private 
sectors. One objective of the PBRAct is to provide incentives for the private sector 
to undertake more R&D and develop improved varieties complementing the public 
research effort. It is apparent from Figures 17 and 18 that the PBR Act did not 
seem to have changed much the activities of the private sector since public 
varieties continued to dominate both application and rights granted. 
Table 3 shows the applicant information for the number of wheat varieties granted 
rights. Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada received the largest number of rights 
followed by two private eompanies (Pflanzenzueht Oberlimpurg and Syngenta 
Seeds Canada Ine.). It is evident that most PBRs granted for wheat cultivars were 
from public institutions. 
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Figure 17: Number ofWheat PBRApplications (1992-2006) 
Source: Canada Food Inspection Agency PBR office (2006a) 
1 An application is defined as a public application if the applicants are from govemment research institutes, 
universities or other research foundations, otherwise they are private applications. Likewise, the rights granted 
are defined by the nature of the applicants as weil. 
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Figure 18: Number of Wheat PBR Rights Granted (1993-2006) 
Source: Canada Food Inspection Agency PBR office (2006a) 
Table 3: Information of Applicants with PBRs Granted (1993-2006) 
Applicants Number of PBRs Type of institution 
Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada 26 Public 
Pflanzenzucht Oberlimpurg 8 Private 
Syngenta Seeds Canada Inc. 6 Private 
NDSU Research Foundation 2 Public 
University of Manit9ba 2 Public 
Saskatchewan Wheat Pool 1 Public 
The Ohio State University Public 
University of Guelph 1 Public 
University of Kentucky 1 Public 
University of Saskatchewan 1 Public 
Virginia Tech Intellectual Properties, Inc. 1 Private 
W.G. Thompson & Sons Limited 1 Private 
Source: Canadian Food Inspection Agency PBR Office (2006a) 
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Country 
Canada 
Germany 
Canada 
U.S. 
Canada 
Canada 
U.S. 
Canada 
U.S. 
Canada 
U.S. 
Canada 
Since the performance of wheat yields depend on the development of 
higher-yielding varieties and on the adoption by farmers, the practice of obtaining 
PBRs on public varieties can increase royalties and thereby lead to reinvestment 
into varietal development. Thus obtaining PBRs on public varieties may help to 
increase wheat productivity. However, it is not possible to test this hypothesis in 
our study as over 90% of wheat varieties planted in western Canada are public 
varieties. 
3.5 Empirical Models for Alberta and Data Description 
3.5.1 Farm Reported Wheat Variety Yield Models 
Industry reported wheat variety yield datais used for the Alberta yield model, as it 
has five years of wheat variety data for five wheat classes in its eight soil zones. 
Unlike the models for western Canada, models for Alberta are estimated for 
different wheat classes. 
Yieldirt = /30 + /31 PBRrt + /32nitrogenrt + /33phosphorusrt + /34Potassiumrt + /35sulphurrt + 
/36precipitationrl + /3iemperaturert + /38Z8 + L /3 M + Birl 
and 
Yieldirt = /30 + /31 PBRi + /32nitrogenrt ++/33phosphorusrt + /34Potassiumrt + /35sulphurrt + 
/36precipitationrt + /37temperaturert + /38Z8 + L /3 M + Birl 
Where 
Yieldirt = the average industry reported wheat yield of variety in soi! zone r III 
year t (bushel per acre) 
P BRrt = the share of acres devoted to variety if it is protected in soil zone r III 
year t 
P BRi = dummy variable, if variety obtained the PBR rights 
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nitrogen
rt = sum of nitrogen applied for wheat in soil zone r III year t (Lbs per 
acre) 
phosphorus
rt = sum of phosphate applied for wheat in soil zone r III year t (Lbs 
per acre) 
potassium
rt = sum of potassium applied for wheat in soil zone r III year t (Lbs 
per acre) 
sulphur
rt = sum of sulphur applied for wheat in soil zone r III year t (Lbs per 
acre) 
precipitationS! = sum of precipitation from May 1 st to July 31 st in selected stations 
in wheat growing areas in soil zone r in year t 
temperature
S
! = sum of daily mean temperature minus 5 degrees from May 1 st to 
Aug 31 st in selected stations in wheat growing areas in soil zone r III 
year t 
Z8 = interaction terms 
M = qualitative variables such as soil zone, variety 
3.5.2 Data Description of Wheat Data in Alberta 
Unlike the western Canada data, the data used for Alberta analysis are different in 
many aspects. First, yield data are at the variety level for different soil zones; 
second, different fertilizer elements are used to measure the impact of production 
inputs on yield. Summary statistics for the major variables used are shown in Table 
4. 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics of Wheat Data in Alberta (1999-2003) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Yield 1039 33.69394 16.17381 1 80 
PBR share 1039 0.034195 0.106567 0 1 
Precipitation 1039 170.6905 85.72633 54 438.2 
Temperature 1039 1200.466 193.1066 854.1 1667.7 
Nitrogen 502 49.20892 19.42531 4 82.2 
Phosphorus 502 22.69125 5.086418 13.38 38.23 
Potassium 499 5.621222 5.990687 0 20.5 
Sulphur 499 3.037355 3.029151 0 18 
Source: Source: Alberta Agriculture and Food (2007a), 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency PBR Office (2006a), Environment Canada (1999-2003) 
From the industry reported variety yield data, there are five classes of wheat grown 
in Alberta: Hard Red Spring, Hard Red Winter, Durum, Extra Strong and Canadian 
Prairie Spring. Wheat yields and insured acres were collected from wheat varieties 
in eight soil zones in Alberta: black soil zone, thin black soil zone, black-dark gray 
soil zone east, black-dark gray soil zone west, brown soil zone, dark brown soil 
zone, gray soil zone and peace river soil zone. Figure 19 illustrates the location of 
the soil zones in Alberta. 
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1. S/ack-Dark Grey West Zone 
2. S/ack-Dark Grey EastZone 
3. Slack Sail Zone 
4. Srown Zone 
5. Dark Srown Zone 
6. Dark GreY-Gray Soil Zone 
7. Gray Sail Zone 
B. Peaee River Sail Zone 
9. Thin Slack Soil Zone 
Figure 19: Location of Soil Zon
es in Alberta 
Source: Alberta Agriculture and
 Food (2007a) 
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Table 5: Number ofWheat Varieties and PBR Varieties Planted in Alberta (1999-2003) 
Class No. of varieties No. of PBR varieties 
Hard Red Spring 39 13 
Durum 14 3 
Prairie Spring 11 4 
Hard Red Winter 8 0 
Extra Strong 5 0 
Total 77 20 
Source: Source: Alberta Agriculture and Food (2007a) 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency PBR Office (2006a) 
Regarding the PBR data, Table 5 shows the number of wheat varieties and PBR 
varieties planted for each wheat class in Alberta. Of the five wheat classes, Hard 
Red Spring wheat had the highest number ofvarieties protected by PBR rights (13) 
followed by Prairie Spring (4) and Durum (3). Wheat varieties of Hard Red Winter 
and Extra Strong had no PBRs granted to them in Alberta. Table 6 illustrates the 
summary statistics for the industry yield data by wheat class. It is evident that the 
mean yield for each wheat class differs but from the descriptive analysis, it is not 
possible to as certain whether the yields for wheat varieties of classes protected by 
PBRs (Hard Red Spring, Durum, Prairie Spring) were higher than those varieties 
from the classes that are not protected by PBRs (Extra Strong, Hard Red Winter). 
Moreover, as the variety yield data were from different wheat classes, the data is 
analyzed by class to test our hypothesis1• 
1 We analyze the Alberta data only for Red Spring, Durum and Prairie Spring wheat. For Hard Red Winter and 
Extra Strong wheat, there were no varieties protected and the observations are small, and consequently omitted 
from the analysis. 
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Table 6: Mean Yield ofWheat by Class in Alberta (1999-2003) 
Class Observation Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Hard Red Spring 648 31.8519 14.092 1 67 
Durum 115 25.7913 11.4221 3 51 
Prairie Spring 185 44.627 20.2696 2 80 
Hard Red Winter 30 30.4 13.9175 7 63 
Extra Strong 61 36.623 15.6089 4 67 
Total 1039 33.6939 16.1738 1 80 
Source: Alberta Agriculture and Food (2007a) 
Other data employed in the analysis included quantities of production inputs and 
climate data. The quantities of production inputs comprised the sum of various 
fertilizers elements applied for wheat in each soil zone over the 1999-2003 period. 
Wheat is very sensitive to insufficient nitrogen (N) and is very responsive to 
nitrogen fertilization. Based on previous research, wheat yields tend to increase 
with increasing rates of nitrogen fertilizer (Bell et al., 1995; Traxler et al, 1995; 
Edwards and Furtan 1998, Alberta Agriculture and Food, 2007d). Phosphorus (P) 
is a nutrient required in relatively large amounts by plants. A study conducted in 
Alberta from 1991 to 1993 to evaluate the responsiveness ofwheat and other crops 
to phosphate fertilizer indicated the importance of phosphate fertilizer in crop 
production (Alberta Agriculture and Food, 2007b). Adequate potassium (K) results 
in superior quality of the whole plant due to improved efficiency ofphotosynthesis, 
increased resistance to sorne diseases, and greater water use efficiency (Alberta 
Agriculture and Food, 2007c). Withoutadequate sulphur (S), wheat can not reach 
its full potential in terms of yield or protein content, nevertheless wheat plants 
require less sulphur than other crops. Many soils in Alberta contain adequate 
sulphur for plant growth; however, a number of specific soil types are deficient in 
sulphur. The brown and dark brown soils in southern Alberta are generally not 
sulphur deficient. Sulphur deficiency can occur on thin black and black soils. 
Sulphur deficiency is very common in Gray soils in both central Alberta and in the 
Peace River region (Alberta Agriculture and Food, 2007e). Figure 20 shows the 
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application rate of each fertilizer element in sorne soil zones. The rate of N 
application for wheat is highest among the four fertilizers foUowed by P, K and S. 
Brown soil zone has the lowest application rates of aU fertilizer elements. 
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Figure 20: Application Rate of Fertilizers in Sorne Soil Zones (1999-2003) 
Source: Alberta Agriculture and Food (Personal contact in 2007) 
Since weather conditions influence the yield of wheat, precipitation and 
temperature are included as explanatory variables. The same measures of weather 
variables are used for Alberta. The only difference is that the precipitation and 
temperature are measured at the soil zone level. The average observations from 
selected weather stations in different soil zones are ca1culated based on the data 
supplied by Environment Canada. Figures 21 and 22 de scribe the precipitation and 
temperature trends for each soil zones in Alberta. The precipitation conditions 
varied among the soil zones, but in 2002 most soil zones experienced a shortage of 
precipitation and perhaps this may have contributed to the overaU low yields in 
2002. The temperature trends behaved similarly among the soil zones with highest 
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temperatures reported in 2001. 
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Figure 21: Sum of Precipitation from May ta July in Alberta (1999-2003) 
Source: Environment Canada (1999-2003) 
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Figure 22: Sum of Daily Temperature from May to August in Alberta (1999-2003) 
Source: Environment Canada (1999-2003) 
Another difference ofthe Alberta industry reported wheat yield model in Alberta is 
that more qualitative variables (M) such as soil zone, individual variety 
characteristics are included in the model. Soil zone variable can be used as a proxy 
for the soil quality and other unobserved quality factors. Likewise, individual 
variety dummy variables will he1p to test whether sorne varieties have a greater 
effect on yie1d than others. 
3.5.3 Estimation Methods 
To test the effects of the PBR Act, two variable measures are adopted. The first 
involves the variable PBRi based on whether PBR varieties are higher-yielding. 
If this is the case, it may indicate that additional revenues may be generated by 
PBR rights leading to greater research and investment and to further deve10pment 
ofhigher-yie1ding varieties. The second PBR measure uses the variable PBR
rt to 
examine whether increased PBR varietal acreage share will increase wheat yie1d. 
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Functional forms such as the log-linear or linear-quadratic were tested for the 
Alberta data but the evidence shows that the linear quadratic term performed better 
in having a better fit coupled with a greater number of variables that were 
significant. Different qualitative variables were included in the estimated 
regressions to avoid too much loss of degrees of freedom. Several diagnostic tests 
were undertaken including heteroskedasticity, omitted variable and 
multicollinearity. Heteroscedasticity and omitted variables is not a serious problem, 
but multicollinearity tends to be problem since there are many variables that were 
correlated with each other. The final model specifications used were those having 
the preferred signs for the coefficient estimates. The magnitude of the PBR 
coefficients did not vary very much for the different models tested. 
The empiricalresults will be presented in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Estimation Results of Wheat Yield Models 
4.1 Introduction 
The Plant Breeders' Rights Act (PBR Act) was expected to have led to improved 
wheat varieties (higher-yielding) for wheat varieties and impact wheat classes 
differently. In this chapter, the results of these hypotheses are tested and presented 
at different levels of aggregation: the provincial wheat yields in western Canada 
and the variety wheat yields in Alberta. The yield models and data were described 
in the previous chapter. This chapter presents the econometric results for key 
regressions and variables. 
4.2 Results for Provincial Wheat Yields in Western Canada 
4. 2.1 Annual Gain in Wheat Yields 
The estimated impact of PBR on provincial wheat yields in western Canada is 
based on the data from 1998 to 2006. According to the data, there are five classes 
of wheat: Hard Red Spring, Hard Red Winter, Extra Strong, Durum and Soft White 
Spring. In order to increase the number of observations in the sample, pooled 
regressions across different wheat classes are estimated. Figure 23 shows the 
annual wheat yield for the five wheat classes in western Canada. The yields of Soft 
White Spring wheat increased at a more rapid rate even though there were no PBR 
varieties reported for this wheat class. From Figure 23, there were yield gaps 
among these wheat classes and the yield gain in Soft White Spring wheat is evident 
while other classes having no clear yield gain pattern but fluctuations. Therefore, 
wheat class dummy variables are included in the regression models to capture the 
yield difference among wheat classes. 
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Figure 23: Annual Yield ofWheat in Western Canada (1998-2006) 
Source: Statistics Canada (1998-2006) 
4.2.2 Provincial Wheat Yield in Western Canada 
Annual yields for the provincial data (British Columbia, Manitoba, Saskatchewan 
and Alberta) across wheat classes are regressed on the PBR variable and other 
explanatory variables including precipitation and temperature. Table 7 shows the 
results from the regression models estimated. 
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Table 7: Coefficient Estimates for Provincial Wheat Yields in Western Canada 
Variable Regression number 
l' 2 2' 
Coefficient estimate a 
Acreage 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 
(1.82) (2.35) (1.85) (2.34) 
PBR area share as % 
r--'. of total area 0.054 0.054 
(0.77) (1.48) 
No. of PBR varieties as % 
of ail varieties 7.659 7.659 
(0.94) (1.83) 
Priee -3.065 -3.065 -3.11 -3.11 
(-1.67) (-1.79) (-1.71) (-1.85) 
Precipitation (May to July) 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012 
(0.62) (0.54) (0.51) (0.44) 
Temperature (May to August) -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 
(-1.11) (-1.06) (-1.18) (-1.12) 
British Columbia 7.881 7.881 7.238 7.238 
(1.23) (1.71) (1.22) (1.66) 
Manitoba -2.780 -2.780 -2.88 -2.88 
(-1.08) (-1.11) (-1.11) (-1.16) 
Saskatchewan -15.269** -15.269** -15.514** -15.514** 
(-5.97) (-5.38) (-6) (-5.39) 
Red Spring -18.03** -18.03** -17.649** -17.649** 
(-2.66) (-3.58) (-2.97) (-3.66) 
Durum -10.959* -10.959* -11.63* -11.63** 
(-2.02) (-2.58) (-2.13) (-2.75) 
Soft White Spring 16.499** 16.499** 16.764** 16.764** 
(5.32) (3.32) (5.37) (3.39) 
Extra Strong -5.825* -5.825* -6.032* -6.032* 
~ 
(-2.1 ) (-2.44) (-2.16) (-2.52) 
Constant 72.726** 72.726** 73.82** 73.82** 
(4.86) (4.99) (4.98) (5.12) 
a * = 5 percent significance level; **= 1 percent significance level. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Regression 1 and l'are based on the coefficient on the PBR area share variable 
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(the share of acreage sown to varieties with Plant Breeders' Rights). As discussed 
in the methodology section, the unobservable effects across region and time in the 
pooled regression may not lead to constant variance of the error term. 
Consequently the Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test is employed to examine the 
problem of heteroskedasticity. Thus regression l' is the robust heteroskedasticity 
correction of the model. Regression 2 is based on a different measure of PBR 
which is the number of PBR varieties as percent of aU wheat varieties. This model 
specification indicated evidence of heteroskedasticity. Regression 2' is the robust 
correction of the model. 
The results from regression l' indicate the coefficient on the PBR area share 
variable is positive but not statistically significant at the 5 percent level of 
significance. This implies that wheat yields at the provinciallevel did not increase 
in response to the adoption of wheat varieties protected by Plant Breeders' Rights. 
The estimated coefficient of the acreage variable is positive and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level of significance. The estimated coefficient of the 
price variable (producer price received from the previous year) is negative but not 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance. The coefficient of the 
provincial dummy variable Saskatchewan is negative and statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level of significance which means, on average, the wheat yields in 
Saskatchewan are lower than the other provinces. The estimated coefficients of the 
wheat class dummy variables indicate that compared to the base wheat class Red 
Winter, the yields of Soft white Spring were higher, while in the other three wheat 
classes Red Spring, Durum and Extra Strong, yields were lower. 
From regression 2', the coefficient of variable PBR number share is positive but 
not statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance. This result 
indicates there is little impact of the proportion of all wheat varieties planted with 
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PBRs on wheat yields. The coefficient of variable Saskatchewan is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. 
From both types of regression, coefficients of variables such as precipitation, and 
temperature are not significant. Thus, we can not tell whether these variables have 
an impact on wheat yields in western Canada during this period. 
Overall, our results did not support that the PBR Act had a positive and statistically 
significant effect on wheat yields in western Canada. These results should be tested 
with caution as sorne fertilizer data was not included for aIl models estimated. 
Implications will be discussed later. 
4.3 Results for Farm Reported Wheat Yields in Alberta 
4.3.1 Variables and Regression Types 
As mentioned previously, by investigating the impact of the PBR Act on wheat 
yields at lower level of aggregation would provide more robust conclusions. 
Moreover, the Alberta data allow us to analyze the different effects of the PBR Act 
on different wheat classes. Because there are many different wheat classes in 
western Canada and the size ofbreeders' market varies, an analysis by different 
wheat classes will provide a betler understanding as to whether the impact of the 
PBR Act differs among wheat classes. The results in this section are based on 
wheat varieties in three wheat classes (Hard Red Spring, Durum and Prairie Spring 
wheat) that have been protected by Plant Breeders' Rights. 
For the analysis in each wheat class, two measures of the impact of the PBR Act 
are employed in several regressions: the P BR area share (share of acres devoted to 
the variety if it has PBRs) and a dummy variable PBR (1= if the variety is 
protected by PBR, O=otherwise). 
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Other explanatory variables included were fertilizer, precipitation and temperature 
variables. Four types offertilizer, nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), potassium (K) and 
sulphur (S) are considered to be important for wheat growing and are included in 
the regression models. In addition, several qualitative variables are included in the 
regressions, including soil zone, variety and year. 
For each wheat class model, wheat yields were regressed on the PBR variable, 
fertilizer variable and weather variables are included in each regression. 
Qualitative variables such as soil zone, year and variety, and interaction terms, 
were considered separately in order not to lose many degrees offreedom. Basically, 
after controlling for the effect of PBR, fertilizer input and climatic factors, 
regression 1 includes soil zone dummy variables to examine regional differences, 
regression 2 includes both soil zone and year dummy variables to examine the time 
and regional differences and regression 3 includes year dummy variables to 
examine time differences. Regression 4 included the interaction term of nitrogen 
and precipitation as previous studies found positive impact on wheat yield (Burt, 
1995). Regression 5 includes the individual variety dummy variables as sorne 
varieties may be higher-yielding than others and thereby may influence the yield 
performance. Because of the multiple numbers of varieties in each wheat class 
sorne of them were combined together. Regression 6 includes the year dummy 
variables in order to examine time, regional and varietal differences. 
The results show that the PBR Act had a positive effect on wheat yields for the 
Durum wheat class model. For the other two wheat classes, the effect of the PBR 
Act was not positively associated with increasing wheat yie1ds (Appendix A for 
Hard Red Spring wheat and Appendix B for Prairie Spring wheat). 
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4.3.2 Resultsfor Durum Wheat 
Table 8 and Table 9 show the results from the regression models estimated. 
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~ Table 8: Coefficient Estimates for Durum Wheat Yield with PBRArea Share 
Regression number 
Variable 2 3 4 5 6 
Coefficient estimate a 
PBR area share 37.358** 37.358** 37.358** 37.358** 16.695 16.695 
(3.59) (3.59) (3.59) (3.59) (1.24) (1.24) 
Nitrogen -1.305** -1.308** -0.856 -3.786* -1.312** -1.332** 
f' (-3.28) (-3.09) (-1.37) (-2.47) (-3.82) (-3.64) 
Phosphorus -7.223** -7.021** -6.308** -7.62** -7.031 ** -5.083** 
(-3.71) (-4.48) (-2.86) (-2.66) (-4.18) (-3.09) 
Potassium 7.1817** 7.0952** 5.5027* 0.1247 7.1268** 6.29** 
(5.39) (6.61) (2.57) (0.44) (6.18) (6.17) 
Sulphur -37.79** -36.97** -30.88* -37** -29.101** 
(-4.42) (-4.63) (-2.51 ) (-4.99) (-3.65) 
Precipitation 0.194** 0.1892** 0.1896** -0.824 0.1874** 0.141** 
(3.29) (4.35) (4.37) (-1.94) (3.67) (3.19) 
Temperature -0.32** -0.318** -0.25** -0.361 ** -0.321** -0.302** 
(-6.34) (-9.74) (-2.88) (-2.86) (-7.36) (-9.96) 
N*P 0.0175* 
(2.21) 
Brown -1.585 -15.31 
(-0.07) (-0.75) 
Dark brown -6.268 -5.498 18.435* -21.56 -14.124* 
(-0.41) (-0.86) (2.39) (-1.45) (-2.17) 
2000 0.681 -5.214 6.578 
(0.07) (-0.64) (0.75) 
2002 -9.79 -27.27** 
(-0.86) (-4.18) 
AC Morse -1.654 -1.654 
(-0.59) (-0.59) 
AC Navigator 5.215 5.215 
(1.59) (1.59) 
Kyle -4.686 -4.686 
~. (-1.37) (-1.37) 
Other -5.315 -5.315 
(-1.76) (-1.76) 
Constant 674.37** 665.84** 537.41** 816.37** 691** 608.635** 
(4.91) (9.78) (2.94) (2.77) (5.83) (9.07) 
Observations 66 66 66 "66 66 66 
R-square Adj 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.88 .88 
~ 
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Regression 1: soU zone dummy variables; 
Regression 2: both soU zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 3: year dummy variables; 
Regression 4: interaction term nitrogen*precipitation, soil zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 5: soU zone dummy variables and variety dummy variables; 
Regression 6: soU zone dummy, year dummy and variety dummy variables. 
a * = 5 percent significance level; **= 1 percent significance level. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Note: AC Morse, AC Navigator, AC Avonlea and Other are the variety dummy variables and 
AC A vonlea is the base variety which is omitted in the estimation to avoid collinearity. 
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Table 9: Coefficient Estimates for Durum Wheat Yields with PBR 
Regression numbers 
Variable 2 3 4 
Coefficient estimate a 
PBR 7.546** 7.546** 7.546** 7.546** 
(5.68) (5.68) (5.68) (5.68) 
Nitrogen -1.296** 0.324 -1.34** -0.93 
r (-3.69) (0.72) (-3.57) (-0.89) 
Phosphorus -6.891** -0.576 -3.2** -1.838 
(-4.01) -0.55 (-4.01) (-0.99) 
Potassium 6.979** -0.462 5.393** 0.551* 
(5.94) (-0.51) (6.77) (2.56) 
Sulphur -35.73** 1.635 ~20.8** 
(-4.74) (0.29) (-4.09) 
Precipitation 0.183** 0.096** 0.094** -0.125 
(3.52) (3.62) (3.58) (-0.4) 
Temperature -0.313** -0.027 -0.28** -0.143 
(-7.05) (-0.61 ) (-11 ) (-1.6) 
Nitrogen*precipitation 0.004 
(0.67) 
Brown -29.02 
(-1.61) 
Dark brown -34.31** -20.2** -3.527 
(-3.13) (-5.06) (-1.22) 
2000 -9.205 12.47 
(-1.28) (1.61) 
2002 -36** -26.38** 
(-5.06) (-4.58) 
Constant 683.4** 55.11 527.3** 291.5 
(5.63) (0.64) (12.77) (1.41) 
Observations 66 66 66 66 
R-square Adj 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.87 
Regression 1: soil zone dummy variables; 
/- Regression 2: both soil zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 3: year dummy variables; 
Regression 4: interaction term nitrogen*precipitation, soil zone and year dummy variables; 
a * = 5 percent significance level; **= 1 percent significance level. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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According to Table 8 and Table 9, the impact of the PBR Act on Dururn wheat 
yield is positive and significant. The estimated coefficient of the PBR area share 
variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. 
On average, an additional 1 percent increase in acre age sown to PBR varieties 
would increase Durum wheat yields by 0.374 bu/acre. Similarly, the coefficient of 
the PBR dummy variable is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level of significance. This implies that if a wheat variety is protected by PBR rights, 
on average, the yield would be higher by 7.546 bu/acre. These results indicate that 
the PBR Act has increased the yield of Dururn wheat. 
The effects for different fertilizers on Durum wheat yields varied. The increased 
quantity of nitrogen, phosphorus and fertilizer sulphur did not increase Durum 
wheat yields. Potassium was the only fertilizer that has positive and significant 
impact on Durum wheat yields. Sulphur is considered to be deficient in most soil 
zones in Alberta, but only brown and dark brown soil zones are considered not to 
be deficient in S. The relatively rich fertilizer of S in brown and dark brown soil 
zones may explain the insignificant effect of the sulphur application rate on wheat 
yields. 
The estimated coefficient on the precipitation variable was found to be positive 
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. On the other hand, 
the estimated coefficient on the temperature variable is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level of significance. This result is consistent with as 
Campbell et al. (1997b) who found air temperature in Saskatchewan and Alberta 
was negatively associated with Hard Red Spring wheat yields. It is possible that 
higher temperatures may cause more soil moisture deficiencies during the growing 
season which is more important than excessive precipitation as a yield determinant 
(Feyerherm and Paulsen, 1981). 
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Because of few observations, many soil zone dummy variables had to be deleted 
from the sample. The coefficients of brown and dark brown soil zones are not 
statistically significant. Similarly, the coefficients for the year 2000 and 2002 are 
not statistically significant as well. The coefficient of the interaction term of 
nitrogen and precipitation is positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level of significance. Burt (1995) estimated a positive relation between nitrogen 
fertilizer and moi sture except when moisture was scarce or excessive. 
From the regression 5 and 6 in Table 8, none of the variety dummy variables are 
statistically significant, while the variety dummy variables of Table 9 are omitted 
in the thesis as variable P BR is dropped automatically in ST AT A due to 
collinearity in their regressions. 
In sum, our results support the hypothesis that the PBR Act increased the yields for 
Durum wheat. On the other hand, our analysis of Hard Red Spring wheat and 
Prairie Spring wheat in Alberta indicates that the PBR Act did not help to increase 
the wheat yields as both variable P BR share area and P BR are not significant at the 
5 percent level of significance. Since Durum wheat comprises a small share of 
production and area of all wheat in Alberta, the PBR Act seems to have a relatively 
small impact on wheat yields. 
4.4 Discussion 
4.4.1 Wheat Yields in Western Canada 
The Plant Breeders' Rights Act in Canada was expected to have increased wheat 
yields. The finding that the PBR Act did not have a positive and statistically 
significant impact on overall wheat yields in western Canada is surprising 
considering one would have expected the PBR Act would induce more R&D 
investment in plant breeding and thereby introducing more varieties with higher 
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productivity. Yet there exist several reasons to explain this result. 
First, it is possible that the PBR Act may have different impacts on different 
classes as breeders' markets vary (it is confirmed from the results of the Alberta 
wheat yield). Yet from our small sample, as explained before, it is not possible to 
analyze by class and we can only analyze the impact across the different classes. 
So the results may not precisely reflect the actual impact of the PBR Act on 
different wheat classes. In the D.S., Aiston and Venner (2002) did a similar study 
by quantifying the effects of the D.S. Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) on 
commercial wheat yields by class and they found the PVP A did not contribute to 
the commercial yields of Hard Red Spring and Hard Red Winter wheat. Similarly, 
other studies investigated different crops in different places and most of results 
showed PVP or PBR did not have much effect on crop yields (Perrin et al. 1983; 
Babcock and Foster 1991, Carew and Devadoss 2003). 
Second, the data are only for 9 years and it prevents us from performing a trend 
analysis as to whether the PBR Act in Canada lead to a structural break of wheat 
yields as most other studies did. Since our data can not tell whether there is a 
structural break of wheat yields, it may not reflect the actual impact. 
Third, it is known that production input factors, environment and climate factors 
are very important to wheat yields, especially nitrogen, phosphate, potassium and 
sulphur. Given the aggregate nature of our data, we are unable to control for these 
factors. Even if we have the precipitation and temperature data to account for 
climatic factors, other environmental factors such as soil quality, insect pressure 
and management practices influence on wheat yields. Without controlling these 
factors, our results may not reflect the actual effect of the PBR Act on wheat 
yields. 
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Last but not least, the purpose of implementing the PBR Act is to induce the 
increase of R&D research for crop breeding so that more varieties with higher 
productivity will be available. However output per unit (yield) is just one measure 
of productivity, other measures include better quality and better resistance to 
insects. Thus it is likely that there is a trade-off between yield and quality so that 
new PBR varieties may have better quality traits but not higher yields. Farmers 
may have planted more wheat varieties with better quality but not higher yields. 
Since our study focused on the impact on yields, important implications for future 
research may focus on the impact of PBR on wheat quality improvement. In this 
context, many countries especially sorne developing countries have implemented 
the PBR policy not only expecting to improve crop yields, but also crop quality 
(Hu et al., 2006). 
Therefore, the results for western Canada are not rigorous enough and we should 
treat the results carefully. 
4.4.2 Wheat Yields in Alberta 
Our results for different classes of wheat in Alberta indicate that the PBR Act has 
increased yields for Durum wheat, but did not have a positive impact on Hard Red 
Spring wheat and Prairie Spring wheat. It confirms our hypotheses that the PBR 
Act had different impacts on different wheat classes. Since the size ofthe breeders' 
seed market varies between wheat classes, our results show that the impact of Plant 
breeders' right differed by market size. 
For Durum wheat, 14 varieties were planted in Alberta from 1999 to 2003, only 3 
were protected with PBR rights (AC Avonlea, AC Morse and AC Navigator). From 
our results, these varieties are higher yielding than other non protected varieties. In 
2006, besides the above varieties, 3 new varieties with PBR rights were planted in 
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Alberta (Napoleon, Strongfield and Commander) and the numbers of none 
protected varieties decreased. This is further evidence that farmers have a tendency 
to plant more varieties with PBR rights for Durum wheat as the protected varieties 
were higher yielding. 
Though the PBR Act increased the yields for Durum wheat, it did not have an 
impact on yields for Hard Red Spring and Prairie Spring wheat, which may 
mitigate the importance of obtaining PBR fights for intellectual property 
protection since Hard Red Spring wheat has about 70% production and acreage of 
all wheat but the protected varieties are not higher-yielding. Our results also 
indicated that the PBR Act had a relatively small impact on wheat productivity 
since the market for Durum wheat is about 20% of the Hard Red Spring wheat 
market. 
Care should be taken in interpreting our results. First, the results of the PBR Act 
impact on Durum wheat yields are only from Alberta from 1999 to 2003, while the 
impact on the other two Durum wheat producing provinces, Saskatchewan and 
Manitoba are not clear. Moreover, as the production and acreage of Durum wheat 
in Saskatchewan is about 80% in western Canada (see FigureI2), we can not 
conclude that the impact of the PBR Act in Saskatchewan is the same as in Alberta 
since sorne planting conditions vary across regions. Further studies may 
investigate the circumstances in Saskatchewan and Manitoba. Second, our data are 
only for 5 years, which prevents us from performing trend analysis. Third, until 
2003, there were no varieties protected with PBRs in the class of Hard Red Winter 
which prevents from analyzing the impact of the PBR Act on this class. Yet until 
2006 two PBR varieties (Radiant and McClintock) were planted in Alberta and 
other western provinces. As we have mentioned before, the numbers and acreage 
of varieties with PBR rights are increasing, further studies can examine the impact 
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with more updated data in order to understand better about the impact of the PBR 
Act. 
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Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1 Conclusions 
Plant Breeders' Rights (PBR) are a form of intellectual property rights enabling 
breeders of new varieties of plants to have the exclusive right to produce and sell 
propagating material of their new plant varieties. Canada passed its PBR Act in 
1990 with the objective of encouraging firms to undertake R&D, technology 
transfer and commercialization of superior varieties. In order to examine the 
achievements of the PBR regime during the past ten years, a review by the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) published in 2001 found the results of 
PBR Act to be generally positive. However, given the subjective nature of the 
analysis, the review was not rigorous enough to be conclusive. This study was 
motivated by the lack of empirical research of the impact of PBR Act on crop 
productivity in Canada and wheat was selected as a case for study. 
There are two main objective of this study: first, to examine the relationship 
between the PBR Act and provincial wheat yields in western Canada; second, to 
examine the relationship between the PBR Act and individual wheat variety yields 
in different classes in Alberta. Yield response function methods were employed to 
test the hypothesis that adoption of the PBR Act led to an increase in overall wheat 
yields and rate of yield increase. 
F or the provincial wheat yields in western Canada, a period from 1998 to 2006 was 
examined with our empirical yield response function model. Our results show that 
the PBR Act did not have a significant effect on overall wheat yields in western 
Canada. The coefficient of the PBR area share variable (the share ofwheat acreage 
sown to varieties with PBR rights) is positive but not statistically significant at the 
5 percent level of significance. The other PBR number share variable (number of 
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PBR varieties as a percent of all varieties) is positive but not statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level of significance as weIl. The insignificant results of 
the PBR Act impact should be interpreted with sorne caution for a number of 
reasons. First, our western Canada observation is relatively small for all wheat 
yields and does not account for differences in wheat classes. Since the PBR Act 
may have different impacts on different wheat classes, the results may not reflect 
the actual impact. Second, due to the limitation of data, our study did not conduct 
structural break and yield trend analysis. Without controlling for trend effects, the 
results may not reflect the actual impact. Third, given the aggregate nature of the 
data, we are unable to control for sorne important factors such as fertilizer rate, soil 
quality, which may lead to the error in the results. Fourth, it is still possible that the 
PBR Act had a positive and significant impact as productivity of wheat yields 
increased but in other forms such as wheat quality improvements. Since 
productivity can be measured such as the yielding ability, pest-resistance and 
quality traits, it is possible that the trade-off between yield and quality exists. 
Farmers may have planted more wheat varieties with better quality. 
For the farm reported wheat variety yields in Alberta, a period from 1999 to 2003 
was examined in the eight soil zones with the empirical yield response function 
model. The impact of the PBR Act was tested in three different classes of wheat: 
Durum wheat, Hard Red Spring wheat and Prairie Spring wheat. 
For Durum wheat, the signs and significance for the two PBR variables are 
consistent. Both of them are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level of significance. With PBR area share variable, on average, an additional 1 
percent increase of acre age sown to varieties with PBR rights would have 
increased the Durum wheat yields by 0.374 bu/acre. With PBR dummy variable, 
on average, the yield of a variety protected with PBR rights is higher than those 
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non protected varieties by 7.546 bu/acre. However, for Hard Red Spring wheat and 
Prairie Spring wheat, the two PBR Act variables are positive but neither is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level of significance. 
The impacts of four types of fertilizer are different for the three classes. For Durum 
wheat, the impacts of nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P) and sulphur (S) are negative 
and statistically significant while the impact of potassium (K) is positive and 
statistically significant. For Hard Red Spring wheat, the impacts of four types of 
fertilizer (N, P, K and S) on yields are positive and statistically significant. For 
prairie spring wheat, only the effects of fertilizer K are positive and statistically 
significant. 
With regard to climate impact, the coefficients of the variable precipitation are 
positive and statistically significant while the coefficients of variable temperature 
are negative and statistically significant for Durum and Hard Red Spring wheat. 
Yet for Prairie Spring wheat, the coefficients of variable precipitation and 
temperature are not statistically significant, indicating climate factors are not 
closely related to prairie spring wheat yields. 
In sum, the results of Alberta reveal that the PBR Act had a positive and significant 
impact on Durum wheat yields while it did not have an impact on both Hard Red 
Spring wheat and Prairie Spring wheat. As we have discussed before, the market of 
Durum wheat is only about 20% of the Hard Red Spring wheat market, which may 
mitigate the importance of obtaining PBR rights for intellectual property 
protection. More over, there are limitations from our study. First, our positive 
result for Durum wheat is only from Alberta, which is the relatively small market 
compared to that of Saskatchewan. There is need to replicate such kind of study in 
other provinces to verify the results. Second, our data ends in 2003, which prevents 
us from performing trend analysis and from analyzing more updated data on other 
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classes of wheat such as Hard Red Winter. 
Overall, our results from western Canada and Alberta indicate that the PBR Act 
had a re1atively small impact on wheat yie1ds, which is consistent with the study of 
Alston and Venner (2002). The results do not support the hypothesis that the 
adoption of the PBR Act led to the increase of overall wheat yields and rate of 
yie1d increase is higher in classes whose varieties are protected with Plant 
Breeders' Rights l . 
5.2 Policy implications 
The finding that the PBR Act has not increased productivity of wheat suggests 
there is a need to improve the design of the PBR regime in Canada. Venner (1997) 
pointed out as an open-pollinated crop, the genotypes of wheat remained 
unchanged across generations so growers can save the seeds from the previous 
harvest according to the "farrners' privilege". Therefore, the inventors or breeders 
could only appropriate the returns of their innovation partially and thereby reduce 
the incentive for R&D. On the other hand, the "farrners' privilege" is not stated in 
the current Act in Canada. With the CUITent Canadian PBR Act, it would not 
exempt farrners from obtaining authorization from the holder of the rights before 
they sell seed produced from a protected variety as a seed for planting. This has 
weakened the intellectual property protection for breeders and may further reduce 
the return of the rents for them. 
Improvement of the design of the PBR regime could encourage private sectors to 
develop advanced varieties of open-pollinated crops. First, Canada operates a PBR 
application system with examinations conducted by the applicant under 
governrnent supervision, which is similar as that of EU, yet it is costly in 
1 Since aIl the three classes ofwheat in Alberta have varieties protected with PBR rights, only the impact of 
the PBR Act on Durum is positive and significant. 
84 
administration and delay and thereby reduces the availability and accessibility of 
new varieties1• Perhaps an effective hybrid system would be the US registration 
process with higher distinctness standards. US registration system is different as no 
variety testing is undertaken and distinctness can be established in any dimensions 
(Lesser, 2000). With a high standard of distinctness, such as defining distinctness 
among varieties by economic value based on performance in experimental trials, 
the PBR system will be more effective (Venner (1997) discusses a detailed 
method). Second, Canada should amend the PBR Act in conformity to the 1991 
UPOV Convention as proposed from different industries to strengthen the 
intellectual property protection in term of restricting the "farms' privilege" and 
"breeders' exemption". Regarding "farmers' privilege", the experience of EU 
(require owners of large farms to pay royalties on saved seed) should be feasible. 
With regard to "breeders' exemption", a phased-in breeder's exemption (limit this 
provision from becoming active until a certain years of protection have passed) 
would enhance the rights of breeders (Eaton, 2006). Third, since previous study 
(Carew and Devadoss, 2003) and our study found different impacts ofPBRAct on 
different crops (canola and wheat), policy makers should take into account it and 
design different and more specific PBR measures respectively for these different 
types of crops in order to better take advantage of the PBR system. 
Other policy options include use of a contract with farmers that develop open 
pollinated varieties. Agreements can stipulate that farmers will not replant 
harvested seed without permission of the breeders and thereby secure intellectual 
property rights to a plant variety innovation on the part of breeders. 
1 In Europe, commodity committees are responsible for identifying relevant attributes for protection and in 
sorne case to establish a minimum statistical standard for meeting that requirement compared to the reference 
variety. Growout trials are undertaken to measure performance in field conditions. (Lesser, 2000) 
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,.r- Appendix A: Results for Hard Red Spri~g Wheat in Alberta 
TableA 1: Coefficient Estimates for Hard Red Spring Wheat Yield with PBR Area Share 
Variable Regression number 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Coefficient estimate a 
PBR area share 5.113 7.866 8.942 7.87 13.814 17.04 
(0.63) (1.45) (1.4) (1.55) (1.03) (1.93) 
Nitrogen -0.278** 0.382** 0.239** 1.032** -0.284** 0.373** 
(-2.64) (4.46) (3.01 ) (8.14) (-2.67) (4.39) 
Phosphorus 0.192 0.518* 0.273 1.502** 0.173 0.493* 
(0.81 ) (2.50) (1.34) (6.15) (0.72) (2.39) 
Potassium 0.371* 0.799** 0.311* 1.161** 0.365* 0.791** 
(2.28) (5.29) (2.45) (7.67) (2.24) (5.31) 
Sulphur 1.579** 0.531 -0.166 2.011** 1.555** 0.476 
(4.47) (1.63) (-0.54) (5.32) (4.35) (1.46) 
Precipitation -0.028** -0.003 0.04** 0.352** -0.028** -0.002 
(-3.02) (-0.35) (6.13) (6.50) (-2.98) (-0.23) 
Temperature -0.08** -0.064** -0.008 -0.01 -0.081** -0.064** 
(-7.81) (-4.75) (-0.8) (-0.65) (-7.79) (-4.82) 
2000 -1.355 -5.868** 2.29 -1.501 
-0.88 (-3.86) (1.49) (-0.99) 
2001 6.632* -7.216** 6.715* 6.381* 
(2.15) (-3.62) (2.33) (2.09) 
2002 -20.754 ** -25.788** -24.812** -21.022** 
(-11.40) (-14.35) (-13.71) (-11.66) 
2003 1.268 -2.356 -9.879** 1.154 
0.43 (-0.95) (-3.05) (0.39) 
Nitrogen*precipitation -0.007** 
(-6.62) 
black 1.245 17.216** -6.973 0.724 -17.578** 
~' 
(0.27) (-4.15) (-1.67) (0.15) (-4.27) 
1 
dark brown -12.993** -22.807** 16.008** -12.845** -22.471** 
(-3.95) (-7.51) (5,30) (-3.88) (-7.48) 
gray -29.394** -54.937** -39.524** -29.538** -54.488** 
(-4.18) (-7.26) (-5.31) (-4.16) (-7.25) 
peace river -17.54** -38.162** -21.781** -17.1** -37.349** 
(-3.47) (-6.51) (-3.62) (-3.36) (-6.44) 
AC Eatonia 2.092 1.944 
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TableAl (cont.) Coefficient Estimates for Hard Red Spring Wheat with PBRArea Share 
Regression number 
Variable 2 3 4 5 6 
Coefficient estimate a 
(-0.46) (0.66) 
AC Intrepid 4.644 6.625** 
(1.31) (2.87) 
AC Splendor 6.069 6.437* 
(1.41) (2.3) 
CDC Teal 5.12 5.536* 
(1.26) (2.08) 
Roblin 1.97 1.842 
(0.46) (0.66) 
Other 2.894 3.515 
(0.84) (1.55) 
Constant 146.678** 99.44** 23.197 -34.232 144.959** 96.866** 
(7.61 ) (4.37) (1.22) ( 1.17) (7.28) (4.26) 
Observations 312 312 312 312 312 312 
R-squared Adj 0.53 0.79 0.71 0.82 0.55 0.8 
Regression 1: soil zone dummy variables; 
Regression 2: both soil zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 3: year dummy variables; 
Regression 4: interaction term nitrogen*precipitation, soil zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 5: soil zone dummy variables and variety dummy variables; 
Regression 6: soil zone dummy variable, year dummy variables and variety dummy 
variables. 
a * =5 percent significance level; **=1 percent significance level. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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/~~. TableA 2: Coefficient Estimates for Hard Red Spring Wheat Yields with PBR 
Regression number 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Coefficient estimate a 
PBR 0.468 1.094 1.17 1.059 0.563 1.092 
(0.38) (1.33) (1.2) (1.38) (0.33) (0.98) 
Nitrogen 0.282** 0.373** 0.238** 1.021** -0.293** 0.357** 
-., (2.67) (4.35) (2.99) (8.06) (-2.75) (4.20) 1 
Phosphorus 0.186 0.499* 0.28 1.482** 0.16 0.458* 
(0.79) (2.40) (1.37) (6.06) (0.67) (2.21) 
Potassium 0.37* 0.786* 0.323* 1.147** 0.366* 0.773** 
(2.27) (5.20) (2.56) (7.57) (2.24) (5.16) 
Sulphur 1.576** 0.503 -0.154 1.982** 1.549** 0.43 
(4.46) (1.54) (-0.5) (5.24) (4.33) (1.32) 
Precipitation -0.028** -0.003 0.04** 0.351** -0.028** -0.002 
(-3.05) ( -0.33) (6.12) (6.49) (-3.01) (-0.2) 
Temperature -0.08** -0.065** -0.008 -0.011 -0.081 ** -0.066** 
(-7.84) (-4.80) (-0.78) (-0.71) (-7.85) (-4.91) 
Black 1.429 -16.779** -6.549 1.007 -17.003** 
(0.31) (-4.05) ( -1.57) (0.21 ) (-4.12) 
Dark brown -12.982** -22.685** -15.895** -12.784** -22.281** 
(-3.94) (-7.47) (-5.26) (-3.86) (-7.38) 
Grey -29.195** -54.128** -38.74** -29.238** -53.406** 
(-4.15) (-7.17) (-5.21) (-4.12) (-7.09) 
Peace river -17.554** -37.88** -21.525** -17.136** -37.053** 
(-3.47) (-6.46) (-3.58) (-3.36) (-6.36) 
2000 -1.395 -6** 2.243 -1.547 
(-0.91 ) (-3.95) (1.46) (-1.02) 
2001 6.529* -7.41 ** 6.612* 6.316* 
(2.11 ) (-3.73) (2.29) (2.06) 
2002 -20.773** -25.964** -24.824** -20.968** 
~. (-11.40) (-14.46) (-13.71) (-11.57) 
2003 1.407 -2.573 -9.726** 1.48 
(0.47) (-1.04) (-3.00) (0.5) 
Nitrogen* 
precipitation 
-0.007** 
(-6.60) 
AC Eatonia 0.534 0.047 
'~" (0.13) (0.02) 
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TableA2 (cont.): Coefficient Estimates for Hard Red Spring Wheat with PBR 
Regression number 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Coefficient estimate a 
AC Intrepid 3.222 4.9* 
(0.99) (2.29) 
AC Splendor 3.775 4.026 
(1.02) (1.67) 
CDC Teal 2.865 3.149 
(0.83) (1.39) 
Roblin -0.258 -0.515 
(-0.07) (-0.21) 
other 0.657 1.097 
(0.25) (0.63) 
Constant 147.537** 101.067** 22.793 -32.431 148.78** 102.369** 
(7.66) (4.44) (1.2) (1.11) (7.60) (4.52) 
Observations 312 312 312 312 312 312 
R-squared Adj 0.53 0.79 0.71 0.82 0.53 0.8 
Regression 1: soi! zone dummy variables; 
Regression 2: both soi! zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 3: year dummy variables; 
Regression 4: interaction term nitrogen*precipitation, soi! zone and year dummy variables; 
RegressionS: soi! zone dummy variables and variety dummy variables; 
Regression 6: soi! zone dummy variable, year dummy variables and variety dummy variables. 
a * = 5 percent significance level; **= 1 percent significance level. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
According to the regressions on the two PBR variables, the PBR Act did not 
increase the yields for Hard Red Spring wheat. The coefficients of the variable 
P BR area share and P BR are positive but none of them are statistically significant 
at the 5 percent level of significance. 
The four types of fertilizer, nitrogen (N), phosphorus (P), potassium (K) and 
sulphur (S) are considered to be important for wheat growing. From TableAl and 
A2, most coefficients of N are positive and statistically significant. The 
coefficients of P are positive and statistically significant, reflecting the importance 
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of P on wheat yields. Adequate K results in superior quality of the whole plant and 
our result indicates that the amount of K used increases wheat yields as the 
coefficients of K are positive and statistically significant. S is considered to be 
deficient in most soil zones in Alberta, only brown and dark brown soil zones are 
considered not to be deficient in S. Our analysis shows that the use of S increases 
wheat yields. 
The estimated coefficients on the variable precipitation that represents 
precipitation in the wheat growing season are positive and statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level of significance. On the other hand, the estimated coefficients 
on the variable temperature that represents air temperature in wheat growing 
season are negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level of 
significance. 
For soil zone dummy variables, black dark gray west, brown and thin black soil 
zone dummies were dropped due to no fertilizer data in these soil zones. The 
estimated coefficients of the other soil zone varieties are negative and most of 
them are statisticaUy significant. For the year dummies, the coefficients of the year 
dummy variable 2002 are negative and statistically significant in aU regression, 
which means Hard Red Spring wheat yield in 2002 was much lower than in other 
years. In the regressions of both Tables, the interaction term of nitrogen and 
precipitation is inc1uded but the estimated coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant, yet the influence is very small. 
In regression 5 and regression 6, individual variety dummy variables are inc1uded, 
however, only the coefficient of the variety AC Intrepid (it has PBRs) is positive 
and statistically significant at 5 percent level of significance. For other varieties, 
none of the estimated coefficients are significant. 
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In sum, our analysis of the Hard Red Spring wheat in Alberta indicates the PBR 
Act did not help to increase the wheat yields as both variable P BR share area and 
P BR are not significant at 5 percent level of significance. 
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Appendix B: Results for Prairie Spring Wheat in Alberta 
TableB 1: Coefficient Estimates for Prairie Spring Wheat Yield with PBR Area Share 
Regression number 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Coefficient estimate a 
PBR area share -0:486 7.725 9.117 7.831 -35.38 -2.963 
(-0.04) (1.07) (1.21) (1.08) (-1.49) (-0.2) 
Nitrogen -0.988** 0.261 0.884** 0.462 -0.902* 0.291 
(-2.69) (1.05) (3.76) (0.99) (-2.45) ( 1.19) 
Phosphorus 0.542 1.372** 0.287 1.51 ** 0.4777 1.284* 
(0.86) (2.7) (0.58) (2.61 ) (0.76) (2.54) 
Potassium 0.097 1.489** 0.93** 1.634** 0.3605 1.53** 
(0.17) (3.44) (2.78) (3.14) (0.6) (3.58) 
Sulphur 1.837* 1.041 -1.66* 1.289 1.6764 0.881 
(2.01 ) (1.33) (-2.46) (1.39) (1.84) ( 1.13) 
Precipitation -0.021 -0.01 0.076** 0.073 -0.017 -0.01 
(-0.71) (-0.6) (5.35) (0.43) (-0.59) (-0.46) 
Temperature -0.075* 0.007 0.054 0.014 -0.065 0.007 
(-2.12) (0.2) (1.87) (0.36) (-1.82) (0.21 ) 
Nitrogen* 
precipitation 0 
(-0.51 ) 
Black 48.82** 24.68 23.9 47.491* 22.529 
(2.61 ) (1.81) (1.74) (2.52) (1.67) 
Dark brown 22.68 12.46 11.66 24.728 12.613 
(1.47) ( 1.13) (1.04) (1.58) ( 1.15) 
Grey 15.74 -16.4 -17.6 12.266 19.116 
(0.57) (-0.74) (-0.79) (0.45) (0.88) 
Peace river 28.98 6.071 5.688 29.549 4.585 
(1.36) (0.34) (0.31) (1.37) (0.26) 
AC Foremost -9.106 1.579 
(-0.94) (0.27) 
AC Taber -15.84 -5.81 
(-1.67) (-1.02) 
Biggar -15.36 -5.22 
(-1.59) (-0.9) 
Other -17.77 -6.847 
(-1.93) (-1.23) 
2000 -14.2** -11.9* -12.8* -14.08** 
;-' .. (-3.39) (-2.15) (-2.5) (-3.42) 
102 
r---.. Table BI (cont.): Coefficient Estimates for Prairie Spring Wheat with PBR Area Share 
Regression number 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Coefficient estimate a 
2001 -8.94 -13.7* -7.9 -8.386 
(-1.23) (-2.12) (-1.05) (-1.18) 
2002 -43.8** -43.2** -44.6** -43.055** 
(-9.88) (-8.22) (-9.38) (-9.72) 
2003 -19.1* -2.92 -20.9* -17.675* 
(-2.44) (-0.41) (-2.42) (-2.26) 
Constant 140.9* -16.1 -76.3 -38.1 138.66* -10.935 
(2.3) (-0.28) (-1.53) (-0.52) (2.27) (-0.19) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 88 
R-square Adj 0.31 0.76 0.69 0.75 0.32 0.77 
Regression 1 : soil zone dummy variables; 
Regression 2: both soil zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 3: year dummy variables with robust correct for heteroskedasticity; 
Regression 4: interaction term nitrogen*precipitation, soil zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 5: soil zone dummy variables and variety dummy variables; 
Regression 6: soil zone dummy variable, year dummy variables and variety dummy 
variables. 
a * = 5 percent significance level; **= 1 percent significance level. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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TableB 2: Coefficient Estimates for Prairie Spring Wheat Yields with PBR 
Variable Regression number 
1 2 3 4 5 
coefficient estimate a 
PBR 4.47 3.94 3.93 4.02897 12.82 
( 1.13) (1.68) (1.45) (1.7) (1.64) 
Nitrogen -0.98** 0.27 0.9** 0.4976 -0.941 
(-2.7) (1.09) (3.83) (1.07) (-2.58) 
Phosphorus 0.48 1.31 0.23 1.467* 0.423 
(0.76) (2.6) (0.49) (2.56) (0.67) 
Potassium 0.09 1.51 ** 0.97** 1.67786** 0.093 
(0.16) (3.54) (2.9) (3.26) (0.16) 
Sulphur 1.77 0.96 -1.74** 1.24303 1.672 
(1.96) (1.24) (-2.66) (1.36) (1.84) 
Precipitation -0.02 -0.01 0.08** 0.08774 -0.012 
(-0.63) (-0.52) (5.43) (0.52) (-0.42) 
Temperature -0.08* 0 0.05 0.01269 -0.073* 
(-2.23) (0.14) (1.84) (0.34) (-2.1 ) 
Nitrogen*precipitation -0.0019 
(-0.59) 
Black 47.9* 23.8 22.8672 48.43* 
(2.58) (1.77) (1.68) (2.57) 
Dark brown 20.6 10.7 9.75094 21.32 
(1.34) (0.97) (0.87) (1.36) 
Grey 15.2 -17.5 -19.032 14.73 
(0.56) (-0.8) (-0.86) (0.54) 
Peace river 28 4.95 4.48665 29.11 
(1.32) (0.28) (0.25) (1.36) 
AC Foremost 14.39 
(1.5) 
AC Taber 8.466 
(0.89) 
Biggar 8.651 
/ 
~- (0.88) 
Other -0.438 
(-0.07) 
2000 -13.8** -11.5* -12.075* 
(-3.32) (-2.11) (-2.39) 
2001 -8.1 -12.7* -6.9017 
(-1.13) (-2.03) (-0.92) 
(' 2002 -43** -42.6** -43.999** 
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TableB2 (cont.): Coefficient Estimates for Prairie Spring Wheat Yields with PBR 
Regression number 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 
Coefficient estimate a 
(-9.86) (-8.07) (-9.4) 
2003 -18.2* -2.1 -20.246* 
(-2.35) (-0.31 ) (-2.37) 
Constant 144* -12.8 -76.3 -38.038 128.6* 
(2.39) (-0.22) (-1.52) (-0.53) (2.09) 
Observations 88 88 88 88 88 
R-square Adj 0.32 0.76 0.69 0.76 0.32 
Regression 1: soil zone dummy variables; 
Regression 2: both soil zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 3: year dummy variables with robust correct for heteroskedasticity; 
Regression 4: interaction term nitrogen*precipitation, soil zone and year dummy variables; 
Regression 5: soil zone dummy variables and variety dummy variables; 
a * = 5 percent significance level; **= 1 percent significance level. 
The t-statistics are in parentheses. 
Prairie Spring Wheat includes Prairie Spring White Wheat and Prairie Spring Red 
Wheat, our data includes both. From the results of both Tables, PBR Act did not 
increase the yield for Prairie Spring Wheat. The estimated coefficients of the 
variable P BR area share and P BR are not statistically significant. Likewise, the 
coefficients of the dummy variable PBR are not significant. 
For the fertilizer variables, the coefficients of fertilizer N, P and S are not positive 
and statistically significant while the coefficients of fertilizer K are positive and 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level of significance. The coefficients of 
variable precipitation are not significant as weIl as those of variable temperature, 
suggesting weather factors are not closely related to prairie spring wheat yields. As 
prairie spring wheat is one type of spring wheat and the growing seasons are 
similar, it is surprising that we did not find the significant climate impact on yields. 
As the coefficients for all the soil zone dummy variables are not statistically 
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significant, we can not find a yield difference between the soil zones. The 
coefficient of the year durnmy variable 2000 and 2002 are negative and 
statistically significant, indicating the yields were lower in these years. For the 
variety dummy variables, estimated coefficients from both Tables are not 
statisticall y significant. 
Overall, the results provide no support that the PBR Act has increased yields for 
prairie spring wheat. 
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